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In 1983 Pakistan initiated a performance evalua-  To strengthen the system, the author sug-
tion, or "signaling:'  system for industrial public  gests:
enterprises (IPEs). The system, which has been
applied to most of Pakistan's IPEs and is ad-  *  Adjusting standard profits to exclude items
ministered by a special unit outside the civil  that distort results (such as nonoperating income
service, involves:  and depreciation) and that take administered
prices into account.
• Selecting performance evaluation criteria.
Rewarding  managers  who reduce  losses  as
e  Assigning criterion values.  well as those who increase profits.
• Negotiating achievement targets for the  *  Allocating bonuses more selectively - on
enterprise.  the basis of individual performance.  This
requires developing adequate personnel evalua-
* Evaluating results.  tion systems.
* Providing bonuses based on the evaluation  * Increasing competition and managerial
(up to three months salary for A grade).  autonomy (particularly decisions on personnel
and credit) to cut costs and increase efficiency.
The focus is on operating efficiency, not
financial retums, and on motivating manage-  *  Studying the impact of policy and regula-
ment by excluding factors beyond the control of  tory decisions on IPEs -for  example, the costs
managers.  of social objectives, price controls, and delays
caused by central decisionmaking.
Even managers critical of the system (in-
cluding some who did not receive bonuses) cite  The paper concludes with suggestions of
the targeting and bonus system as a powerful  ways to simplify and adapt the system for uc  t  in
incentive to improve efficiency.  other countries.
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This  report  assesses  the  performance  evaluation  system  being  used
for  industrial  public  enterprises  in  Pakistan. The  assessment  aims  to
assist  the  Pakistani  government  in strengthening  the  system  as  needed,  and
to inform  interested  officials  in  other  countries  of the  costs  and  benefits
of the  system  and  how it  might  be adapted  for  their  use.
The  Signalling  System
Chapter  II  briefly  describes  the  performance  evaluation  system,
or "signalling  system",  which  began  to  operate  in Pakistan  in  1983. The
signalling  system  has  been  applied  to  most  of the  industrial  public
enterprises  (IPEs)  under  the  Ministry  of Production  (between  41 and  56 IPEs
have  been  evaluated  out  of 66 in total). The  system  involves:  (i)
selecting  suitable  performance  evaluation  criterion;  (ii)  assigning
criterion  values  based  on the  enterprises's  past  performance,  its
objectives,  the  operational  and  financial  eoi.straints  it is  expected  to
face,  and  the  like;  (iii)  setting  targets  of  achievement  in  negotiation
with the  enterprise  (five  grades  from  A to E  are  used  in Pakistan);  (iv)
evaluating  results;  and  (v)  providing  a  bonus  on the  basis  of the
evaluation  (up  to three  months  of salary  for  the  A grade). The  system  is
administered  by the  Experts  Advisory  Cell (EAC),  a special  unit  attached  to
the  Ministry  of Production  (MOP)  but  outside  the  civil  service,  -Ihich  is
financed  by a levy  on the  state  enterprises.-ii-
The  original  proposal  for  the  signalling  system  assumed  that  the
performance  evaluation  of  public  enterprises  in  Pakistan  should  differ  from
private  ones  to take  into  account  the  different  objectives  of government,
factors  which  are  beyond  the  control  of a  public  manager  (such  as the
quantity  and  quality  of capital  employed)  and  the  administered  prices  faced
by  many  IPEs. Thus,  the  focus  was  on operating  efficiency  rather  than
financial  returns  and the  proposed  criterion  for  evaluation  was public
profitability  in constant  prices.
Public  profits  differ  from  private  profits  as follows: (i)  taxes
are  added  back in  since  government  does  not  want  to  motivate  managers  to
reduce  taxes;  (ii)  depreciation  is  add,d  back to  avoid  awarding  older
plants  vis-a-vis  newer  ones;  (iii)  interest  is  added  since  interest
payments  represent  transfers  rather  than  changes  in  efficiency,  plus  debt
and  investment  decisions  are  best  handled  through  a separate  control
system;  (iv)  non-operating  income  is  subtracted  since  the  aim is to  measure
operating  efficiency;  and (v)  a charge  is  included  for  the  opportunity  cost
of capital,  since  IPE  managers  cannot  usually  control  their  capital  stock
but  they  can  control  their  working  capital. Public  profits  are then
divided  by fixed  operating  assets,  thus  adjusting  for  changes  due to
expansion.
Public  profitability  would  then  be converted  to constant  prices
and  IPEs  evaluated  on the  trend  in  the  resulting  indicator.  The trend  in
this  indicator  in  constant  prices  is  a measure  of operating  efficiency
similar  to total  factor  productivity.  It  was considered  especially-iii-
appropriate  since  many  IPEs  faced  administered  prices. However,  for
reasons  described  in  the  text,  the  Government  decided  to  use  standard
private  profits  as the  primary  indicator  of  performance.
Imgact  of the  System  on Performance
Chapter  III  assesses  the  impact  of the  signalling  system  on IPE
performance  using  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  evidence. In terms  of
financial  profits  some  58  percent  of the  IPEs  under  the  system  showed  an
improvement  in  performance.  Some  of these  profits  were  due  to increases  in
prices  or windfall  gains  in  non-operating  income. To assess  the  impact  on
operational  efficiency  the  report  assessed  a sample  of 12 IPEs  in  detail.
Seven  out  of the  sample  of 12  showed  an improvement  in  operating  efficiency
(measured  as public  profitability  in constant  prices).
Not surprisingly  it  was  difficult  to isolate  the  signalling
system's  impact  on efficiency  from  other  influences.  Nevertheless,  it  was
possible  to  rule  out  a  number  of  potential  explanations  for  efficiency
gains  of the  sample  IPEs  (including  changes  in the  macroeconomy,  markets,
liquidity,  capacity,  technology,  etc.;  see  text). There  were,  however,
important  changes  in the  supervisory  environment  and  parallel  changes  in
management  that  were  probably  critical  to  the  impact  of the  signalling
system. For  example,  the  MOP fired  some  managers  for  incompetence;  access
to  subsidies  was  curbed,  etc.
The  qualitative  evidence  (from  interviews  with  managers  and
government  officials)  suggests  that  the  system  provided  managers  with  an-iv-  e  J
added incentive to respond to these environmental changes and a tool (in
the form of bonuses) to motivate staff.  The targeting and bonus system was
cited by all managers consulted, even those critical of the system and
those not receiving  bonuses, as a potentially powerful incentive for
efficiency improvements.
This evidence of positive impact is  noteworthy since it arises
despite a number of factors which constrain the system's influence.  The
most important constraint is limited  managerial autonomy to cut costs and
increase efficiency.  For example, managers cannot control their labor
costs very effectively (although  this may be changing), cannot cut off
service or close plants, have limited flexibility in procurement decisions,
are constrained in their ability to raise capital, and must cope with
government-imposed social welfare objectives.  The system's impact is
further limited by the exclusion of loss making IPEs; managers are given no
incentive for reducing losses (this also may be changing).
Impact of the System on Government Policy
The signalling system  has not so far had a major impact on
government policy vis-a-vis the IPEs or on decisions to restructure the
sector and close and liquidate firms (Chapter IV).  This despite the fact
that the system generates a lot of information that could serve these
purposes.  One reason for this is that the EAC was set up for and is most
effective at influencing  management.  Another is that  policy decisions are
not in the hands of the MOP.  (The  MOP was set up to supervise the IPEs;
industrial  policy is handled by another  ministry; Finance and other-V.
ministries  are  involved  in such  decisions  as pricing,  labor  policy,  or the
allocation  of foreign  exchange.) Furthermore,  the  system  was set  up to
calculate  operating  efficiency  and  not  allonative  efficiency,  although  the
information  it generates  could  be adapted  for  that  purpose. One risk  of
focusing  on  maximizing  performance  within  the  status  quo  is that  the  system
might  actually  reduce  the  pressures  for  change  and  restructuring.
Strengthening  the  System  in  Pakistan
The  report  suggest  some  ways  to improve  the  operations  of the
system  in Pakistan  (Chapter  V),  notably:
1.  Adjusting  standard  profits  to  exclude  the  items  which
distort  results  (such  as  non-operating  income  and
depreciation)  and  to take  administered  prices  into  account
where  these  still  exist. The  EAC  tries  to take  such
anomalies  into  account  by adding  physical  targets  and  by
making  adjustments  in the  process  of setting  its  targets  and
grades. The  evidence  of the  sample  enterprises,  however,
suggests  that  its  successes  in  making  targets  reflect
efficiency  improvements  has  been  limited. There  is
legitimate  concern  about  confusing  managers  with a  change,
but in  fact  the  addition  of other  partial  targets  makes  the
system  more  complex  and  its  impact  unpredictable.
2.  Rewarding  managers  who  reduce  losses  can  be as,  or  more,
beneficial  as  motivating  managers  who increase  profits. The
EAC  is  considering  ways  to give  bonuses  to  loss-making
firms.-vi-
3.  Allocating  bonuses  more  selectively  among  the  staff  of an
IPE  on the  basis  of individual  performance  would  be highly
desirable  and  merits  developing  adequate  personnel
evaluation  systems  in  the  future.
4.  Increasing  competition  and  managerial  autonomy  to cut  costs
and  increase  efficiency  would  reduce  the  need  for  so  many
adjustments  to the  targets  and  increase  the  efficiency
gains. Decisions  on  personnel  and  credit  seem  to  merit
particular  attention.
5.  Studying  the  impact  of policy  and  regulatory  decisions  on
the  IPEs  could  multiply  the  influence  of the  signalling
system.  The  EAC  has  begun  to  use  its  information  for  these
purposes. (For  example,  they  are  developing  a social
accounting  matrix  anc  studying  labor  policy). Examples  of
potentially  useful  studies  include  the  costs  of social
objectives,  of  price  controls,  of delays  because  of
centralized  decision  making.
Applying  the  System  in  Other  Countries
Chapter  VI of the  report  assess  the  costs  versus  the  benefits  of
the  signalling  system  and  how it  might  be adapted  to  other  countries;  The
net  benefits  for  another  country  cannot  be determined  in the  abstract  since
there  are  factors  that  might  raise  the  costs,  as  well  as  ways to increase
the  potential  benefits. The installation  and  operation  costs  of the  system
in  Pakistan  are in fact  rather  modest,  but  the  system  benefitted  from
skilled  managers  in  the  IPEs  and  skilled  staff  in the  EAC,  as  well  as the
reliable  and  timely  information  already  collected  by the  EAC. Moreover,
the  Pakistani  system  was  designed  for  the  70 or  so companies  under  the  MOP,
which  include  a number  of similar  firms  and  some  relatively  simple-vii-
processing  industries  (cement,  for  example). Other  countries  may  need to
improve  the  information  and  skill  base  considerably  and  to  apply  the  system
to more,  and  more  diverse,  companies. (Egypt,  for  example,  is
contemplating  applying  a similar  system  to some  200  public  enterprises.)
The  benefits  from  the  system  could  be maximized  by increasing
competitive  pressures  for  efficiency  wherever  possible. This  would  allow
more  enterprises  to  be judged  by public  profit  targets  at  current  prices.
The signalling  system  is in  a sense  a  market  proxy;  it  creates  pressures
for  efficiency  that  in  other  circumstances  might  be supplied  (and  supplied
more  effectively)  by the  market. Thus  it  makes  sense  to free  markets  where
possible  and  focus  the  system  on  monopolies.  Giving  managers  greawer
autonomy  to  respond  to  pressures  for  efficiency  will further  increase  the
benefits  from  performance  evaluation.  Benefits  will  also  depend  on the
environment  for  managers. The  general  hardening  of the  managerial
environment  was  an important  factor  in  the  efficiency  gains  in  Pakistan.
Performance  evaluation  systems  are  of limited  use  without  strong  commitment
from  top  decision-makers  and  a demonstrated  readiness  to fire  managers  who
do not  perform.
Finally,  the  system  can  be adapted  to  circumstances  in  other
countries  in several  ways. It could  be  made  much  simpler,  at least  at the
outset,  by, for  example,  shadow  pricing  a few  critical  items  (such  as
electricity,  wages,  and  foreign  exchange). It  could  be applied  to only  the
10 or 15  public  enterprises  that  are  us  -'  y the  key  to economic
development  (such  as the  utilities  and  transport  companies,  etc.). Public-viii-
recognition  of top  performers  could  be enhanced;  it  can  be as important  as
bonuses  in some  cultures. In  addition,  the  amount  of macroeconomic
information  generated  by the  system  could  be increased  and  aggregated  for
planning  and  decision-makirg  purposes.I.  INTRODUCTION
This  report  provides  an  early  assessment  of Pakistan's
performance  evaluation  system  for  its  industrial  public  enterprises  (IPEs).
This assessment  aims  to:  (i)  provide  suggestions  to the  Pakistani
Government  on  ways to  strengthen  the  system;  (ii)  inform  officials  of other
countries  interested  in replicating  the  system;  and (iii)  suggest  ways it
might  be adapted  to circumstances  in  other  countries,
The  report  gives  a  brief  history  and  description  of the  system
(Chapter  II),  assesses  its  day  to  oay  workings  (Chapter  III),  and
calculates  its  impact  on  performance  and  management  (Chapter  IV)  and  on
government  policy  (Chapter  V).  It then  provides  suggestions  for
strengthening  the  system  in Pakistan  (Chapter  VI).  In concludes  with a
chapter  on applying  the  system  in  other  countries  that  compares  costs  with
potential  benefits,  and  recommends  ways to  adapt  the  system  to  other
countries.
II.  BRIEF  HISTORY  AND  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  SYSTEMI
A.  Overview  of Industrial  Public  Enterprises  (IPEs)
Under  the  Ministry  of Production  (MOP)
From  independence  in 1947  to  1971,  most  economic  activity  in
Pakistan  was  carried  out  by the  private  sector;  the  public  sector  supported
1/  This  chapter  draws  heavily  on Leroy  Jones  and  Istaqbal  Mehdi,
"Pakistan  Signalling  Project"  (draft,  September  1985).-2-
development  largely  by providing  basic  infrastructure.  The  state's
presence  in the  manufacturing  sector  began  in 1950  with the  establishment
of the  Pakintan  Industrial  Development  Corporation  (PIDC)  to support  the
creation  of state  enterprises  in the  manufacturing  sector  which
(presumably)  would  eventually  be transferred  to the  private  sector. From
1972  to  1977,  the  industrial  and  financial  sectors  were  progressively
nationalized,  and the  number  of IPEs  increased  from  22 in 1972  to 55 in
1977. The  nationalized  industries  included  iron,  steel,  basic  metals,
heavy  engineering,  motor  vehicles,  chemicals  and  petrochemicals,  and
cement.
The  post-1977  government  adopted  a different  strategy,
emphasizing  the  importance  of free  market  forces  in  economic  development.
Sustained  growth  was to  be achieved  on the  basis  of greater  private  sector
participation  and  more  diversified  and  export-oriented  production.  The
government  was  to  provide  the  basic  infrastructure  needed  to support  the
private  sector,  and  public  investment  was to  oe oriented  towards  the  social
sectors  in  order  to improve  the  country's  human  resource  base  and  ensure
that  a  broader  sector  of the  population  benefited  from  economic  growth.
In the  last  ten  years,  Pakistan  has  privatized  some  public
corporations,  reestablished  fiscal  control  and  acted  to  restore  private
sector  confidence.  The  Sixth  Plan (1984  to 1988)  aims  to  create  adequate
conditions  for  private  investment  and  has started  programs  to  encourage
increased  private  sector  participation  as  well  as more  efficient  investment
and  production  decisions  through: deregulation,  appropriate  input  and
output  pricing,  and  opening  up the  economy  to increased  competition  from-3-
abroad.  During the first three years of the plan, there has been progress
in a number of areas, for example:  (a)  liberalization of investment
sanctioning; (b)  deregulation of cement, edible oils, and nitrogenous
fertilizer  prices; (c) rationalization  of natural gas prices for both
producers and consumers; (d)  opening up of Basmati rice, edible oil and
fertilizer  production to the private sector; and (e)  more flexible exchange
rate management to ensure international  competitiveness.  As a part of this
same effort, the government conducted a review of the public manufacturing
sector,  which resulted in two reports (Uqaili  and Beg Reports).  Based on
the recommendations  of these reports, the government reorganized the
industrial public enterprise sector into its present structure.
Today there are 66 IPEs grouped in eight holding companies or
corporations under the MOP (Table 1 provides background information  by
holding companies), plus a new steel project.  The MOP is an administrative
ministry (a Ministry of Industry sets sector-wide policy) and is
responsible for monitoring the IPEs to ensure that they are managed
efficier.tly. Specifically MOP:  (i) formulates long-term  policies for
public sector enterprises in consultation  with the corporations; (ii)  does
long-term planning and coordination  among corporations and enterprises;
(iii) sets IPE objectives and evaluates their performance; and
(iv) appoints senior executives and approves the appointment or promotion
of other top managers.  A special unit, the Experts Advisory Cell (EAC),
was created in 1980 to assist the  Ministry in  monitoring performance,
evaluation, and planning.  The Cell is financed  by a levy on the IPEs and
its staff are not part of the civil service.TABLE I
PMISTAN:  CONSOLDATED  8A0(atMW  DrTIIIN  ON  THE  CUWPRATIONS  OF THE  MINISTRY  OF FROOUCTION  (a)
Number  of  Production  valus  at  Not  Sales  Pro-t.  Profit  Number  Eploy.es  Salaries  Value
CWORAITIII  Aconr  s  nit  constan%t  price*  of  1977-78  I  *.  in  llil.  (Lose)  R  inNill)  as*n  30  June  of:  and  Wagma  Added
1902/63  Is9/8  1982/83  1985/80  6/  0s  tsj  198F  1905/86  1963  1966  1904/66  105/66  1985/86
Federel  Chemicel  and  FCCCL  13  14  648  120  1301  1679  7  14  6275  7549  239  294  w99
Cern-;e-  Corperation
National  Fortiliaer  WtC  6  6  1528  1602  3614  4391  99  646  5231  5442  226  250  1938
Co,roration
Pakiston  Automb  il  PACO  I1  12  2914  2742  4636  4709  320  157  8570  7469  386  399  o11
Cororstion
Pehistan  Industrial  PrIC  S  10  237  451  426  473  -214  -182  3315  6733  e0  6S  6o
O"Glopeent  Corporation
Stte*  Cmnt  Corporation  SCCP  it  13  1751  2217  3943  4599  460  766  11114  12510  564  64  2254
State  byinsering  SC  10  10  2025  1951  2252  2217  45  -23  136  14603  447  4"  643
cal  Corporation
TeittileNchinory  Cor-  THC  2  2  0  7  56  36  -14  -26  0  483  13  II  17
poration  Limited
T  T A  L:  61  70  11616  13291  25454  26330  1423  1463  50977  sso50  2024  2238  7070
SOURC:  EAC  Annual Reporta.
(a)  Doe.  not  include  Pakitan  Steel  N;ill  Corporation.-5-
B.  Description  of the  Signalling  System
Background
The concept  of a  public  enterprise  performance  evaluation  system
was introduced  at  a Symposium  sponsored  by the  Government  of Pakistan  and
the  United  Nations  in  Islamabad  in  November  1981.2
The  Government  decided  to  proceed  with  the  system  and in  December  1981
signed  a contract  with  a consulting  firm  to implement  the  system. 3
The  system  is  based  on the  following  key  assumptions:
(a)  Managers  can  be given  a clear  perception  of their
objectives;
(b)  IPEs  in  Pakistan  can  be improved;
(c) Managers  can  control  enterprise  performance;
(d)  IPE  managers  will  respond  to incentives  (monetary  and
non-monetary);
(e) Managers  can  be given  ready  access  to information  and  other
rsources  necessary  to improve  IPE  performance.
(d)  Performance  can  be measured  objectively  and  fairly,  hence
its  evaluation  will  send  the  right  "signals"  to  managers.
2/ In  a paper  presented  by Leroy  Jones,  "Towards  a Performance
Evaluation  Methodology  for  Public  Enterprises:  With  Special
Reference  to Pakistan."
i/ Jones'  consulting  firm,  Institute  for  Development  Research  of
Boston  (IDR).-6-
On the basis of these assumptions, the so-called signalling
system was designed with three components.
(a)  A performance evaluation system to specify socially
desirable performance;
(b)  A Public Enterprise  Performance Information System (PEPIS)
to accurately measure economic performance, and
(c)  An incentive  system to reward managers and staff on the
basis of actual  versus targeted performance.
The EAC was given the main responsibility  for developing and implementing
performance evaluation system.
The performance evaluation system consists of four key steps:
the selection of general performance evaluation criteria, the selection of
specific units to measure enterprise performance, the assignment of weights
to evaluation criteria, and the  negotiation of criterion  values to
differentiate good from  bad performance.  This provides the basis for
evaluating performance at the end of the year and providing incentives
based on results.  The main steps involved in the signalling system are
shown in Table 1 of the Statistical  Appendix.-7-
Table  2:  Pakistan  - Units  Under  the  Incentive  System
19P.3/84  1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Federal  Chemical  & Ceramics  Corp.  (FCCI.)  10  13  11  12
National  Fertilizer  Corporation  (NFC)  5  6  6  6
Pakistan  Automobile  Corporation  (PACO)  7  10  7  3
Pakistan  Industrial  Dev.  Corporation  (PIDC)  1  2  4  3
State  Cement  Corporation  (SCCP)  10  12  12  13
State  Engineering  Corporation  (SEC)  7  9  9  5
State  Petroleum  Refining  and
Petrochemical  (PERAC)  1  2  2  2
Textile  Machinery  Corporation  (TMC)  0  2  0  0
TOTAL  41  56  51  44
Total  IPEs  in  MOP  63  70  70  66
Source: EAC  Annual  Reports.
Selection  of  performance  evaluation  criterion
The  original  proposal  for  the  system  assumed  that  performance
evaluation  of  public  firms  in  Pa.istan  must  differ  from  private  ones
because: (i)  public  enterprises  should  be rewarded  for  maximizing  the
benefits  to society  as a  whole  and  not  just  to the  equity  holder  of the
unit;  (ii)  IPEs  generally  have  non-commercial  as  well  as commercial
objectives;  and, (iii)  many  factors  which  determine  enterprise  performance
(such  as quantity  and  quality  of the  stock  of capital  employed,  location,
fixed  input/output  purchase  agreements  with  other  public  enterprises,  etc.)
are  beyond  the  control  of  public  managers.-8-
Taking  this  into  account,  the  system  was  originally  designed  to
evaluate  operational  efficiency  using  public  profitability  in  constant
prices. The  designer  of the  system  argued  that  simple  profits  as used  for
private  firms  would  not  be adequate,  since  they  only  show  the  difference
between  costs  and  benefits  to the  individual  firm  and  do  not adequately
reflect  the  difference  in the  value  to  society  between  what  the  enterprise
takes  out  of the  economy  and  what  it  puts  back.  Public  profit  is an
indicator  that  is intended  to increase  only  when society  as a  whole  is
better  off.  It  also  adjusts  for  accounting  anomalies  that  might  distort
the  measurement  of efficiency.
Public  profits  are  calculated  as follows:




- Nonoperating  income  (financial  income  and  rent,
capital  gains  and  transfers)
- Opportunity  cost  of  working  capital
- Public Profits
Taxes  are  added  back in  since  this  is  a return  from  government's  point  of
view.  This  avoids  giving  PE  managers  a reward  for  reducing  taxes.
Depreciation  is  added  back  because  including  it  would: penalize  newer
plants  vis-a-vis  older  ones,  cause  profits  and  profitability  to increase
(assuming  no new  investment)  without  any  increase  in efficiency,  and  reward
PEs  for  underdepreciating  or changing  their  accounting  practice  so as to
reduce  depreciation  charges. Interest  is  added  back  because  changes  in
interest  payments  do  not  reflect  changes  in efficiency  but transfers  from-9-
one  part  of society  to another. The  assumption  is that  enterprise
investment  and  debt  decisions  are  best  handled  through  separate  control
systems  designed  to  assure  the  most  efficient  allocation  of capital.
Nonoperating  income  is  excluded  since  it  does  not  reflect  operating
efficiency.  And, finally,  a charge  is  added  for  the  opportunity  cost  of
working  capital  (in  1983/84  figured  as 10.5  percent  times  inventories;
cash,  demand  deposits,  accounts  receivables  and  the  like). The IPEs  are
charged  for  fixed  capital  by i.ncluding  fixed  operating  assets  in the
denominator,  thus  adjusting  tor  changes  due  to  expansion.
Public  profitability  would  then  be converted  to constant  prices
using  a  divisa  index. 4 Since  managers  of IPEs  in  most  cases  cannot  change
prices,  constant-priced  profit  attempts  to  measure  factors  they  can  change.
(Since  the  divisa  index  relies  on constantly  changing  weights,  managers
still  have  an incentive  to  seek  lower  costs  or  higher  profits  through  price
changes  where  they  have the  option.) The  trend  in  public  profit  in
constant  prices  is  appropriate  for  performance  evaluation  but  not for
investment  evaluation. IPEs  would  then  be evaluated  by the  trend  in  public
profitability  in  constant  prices.
The  proposal  suggested  that  public  profits  would  be further
adjusted  to take  into  account  the  costs  of any  noncommercial,  social
)bjectives  that  might  affect  performance  trends. But  since  such  costs  are
likely  not to fluctuate  much  from  year  to  year in  constant  prices,  this  was
i/ See  Appendix  A for  an explanation  of this  index.-10-
a complication  that  could  be safely  ignored,  &t  least  in the  start-up
phase. The  more  common  costs  stemming  from  social  objectives  (besides
price  controls)  are  associated  with  remote  locations  (to  promote  regional
development)  or redundant  workers  (to  increase  employment),  and  these
usually  do  not  markedly  affect  the  year-to-year  trends  in  efficiency.
The  original  design  also  called  for  supplemental  indicators  to
take  into  account  dynamic  considerations  (i.e.,  expenditures  for  research
and  development,  maintenance,  training,  introduction  of  new  products.  etc.)
Otherwise,  the  IPE  might  tend  to  neglect  those  items  which  have  a short-
term  cost  and  a long-term  benefit. Other  qualitative  indicators  measuring
such  factors  as  project  implementation  were  also  proposed. These  have  not
yet  been implemented  and  there  is  some  evidence  that  IPEs  are  sacrificing
the  long-term  health  of the  company  to short-term  profits  (see  Section
III-E  below).
In 1983  the  original  design  of the  system  was substantially
changed  in  order  to  win the  Ministry  of Finance's  (MOF)  agreement  to the
bonus  system. MOF agreed  to allow  bonuses  to  be paid  only if the  basic
performance  criterion  was  private  profits  after  taxes. One  reason  for  this
was  MOF's  reluctance  to  permit  bonuses  to  be paid  to staff  of IPEs  showing
private  losses  but improving  public  profitability  at constant  prices.
(This  is  possible  since  many  of the  enterprises  face  price  distortions.)
MOF  also  worried  about  the  public  relations  impact  (officials  envisioned
such  headlines  as "Public  Sector  Loses  Money;  hanagers  Rewarded").  Another
concern  was that  workers  in  money-losing  PEs  would  have to  be paid  bonuses-11-
when their  managers  got  bonuses,  but it  was unlikely  that  workers  in
profitable  IPEs  would  forgo  bonuses  even if  their  managers  were  not
rewarded;  (This  could  happen  if the  trend  in  constant  priced  profits  was
downward). A third  reason,  which  was  not  explicitly  voiced  by MOF,  may
have  been  MOF's  own  interest  in the  IPE's  maximizing  their  private  profits,
since  this  reduces  the  pressures  on Finance  for  relief  in  the  forms  of
refinancing,  higher  prices,  etc.  Finally,  there  was  a concern  that  non-
economists,  including  the  managers  of IPEs,  would  find  public  profitability
hard to  grasp.
Today,  the  system  is  measuring  IPEs  principally  on the  basis  of
private  financial  profits  after  tax  in  current  prices. The  EAC  has added
some  other  indicators  to  measure  physical  production  or energy  consumption.
(See  Table  2 of the  Statistical  Appendix  for  some  examples),  and it  has
tried  to  adjust  profits  for  companies  facing  cost  plus  pricing  (see  Chapter
III). When  more  than  one  criterion  is  used,  the  EAC  assigns  weights  chat
rnflect  the  importance  Government  assigns  to  each  one.
Setting  Targets
Targets  are  based  on  budgetary  proposals  presented  by the
enterprises  according  to  a format  provided  by the  EAC. The  EAC  analyzes
the  proposals,  taking  into  account  various  considerations,  such  as:
(i)  The  enterprise's  initial  objective,  designed  capacity  and
budgeted  profit;
(ii) The  unit's  performance  record  in recent  years;
(iii)  The  different  financial  and  operational  constraints  the
enterprise  is  expected  to face  during  the  evaluation
period;  and
(iv) The  enterprise's  macroeconomic  environment.-12-
It also  looks  at the  actual  results  for  the  past  year  and  the  budgeted  and
expected  results  for  the  current  year.
Based  on these  considerations,  the  EAC  attempts  to set  optimum
targets,  prepares  a draft  summary  of  possible  targets,  and  invites  the
individual  managing  directors  to  discuss  the  proposed  criteria. For  each
proposed  criterion  the  EAC  prepares  five  targets,  representing  the  range  of
targets  from  highest  to lowest. The  C target,  is usually  based  on the
enterprise's  budgeted  figure. B is  usually  5  percent  higher  and  A is 10
percent  above  C; D is  5  percent  lower  and  E is  anything  less  than  D.
During  the  negotiations  between  the  EAC  and  the  MDs,  the  EAC  takes  into
consideration  the  general  business  environment,  the  parameters  within  which
tile  enterprise  is  expected  to  operate  (i.e.,  tariff  or exchange  rate
changes,  price  and  wage  policies,  etc.),  and  trends  in  the  cost  of
production.  The EAC  focuses  on how  to increase  production  and  sales while
minimizing  costs.
Targets  are  officially  agreed  in  a contract  between  the  EAC  and
the  MDs,  subject  to the  approval  of the  Ministry  of Production.  After
signing  the  contract,  the  enterprise  management  is,  :n  principle,  left  on
its  own to  make  all  efforts  necessary  to  achieve  the  t.:rgets.
Evaluation
Once it  receives  the  audited  accounts,  the  EAC  calculates  a
composite  performance  score  for  the  enterprise  by multiplying  the  assigned
target  weight  by the  grade  obtained  and  then  aggregating  the  resulting-13-
scores. At this  time  or  earlier,  the  MD can  try  to  convince  the  EAC  that
unforseen  and  uncontrollable  circumstances  (e.g.,  power  outages)  warrant  a
change  in its  targets.
Incentive  System
The  incentive  system  consists  of bonuses  based  on the
enterprise's  achievement  of the  targets. Depending  on the  enterprise's
category,  the  management  and  all  nonunionized  staff  receive  the  following
rewards:
Grade  A  Excellent  3 months  base  salary
Grade  B  Very  Good  2  months  base  salary
Grade  C  Good  1 month  base  salary
Grade  D  Poor  15 days  base  salary
Grade  E  Unacceptable  Nil
Only  profitable  IPEs  receive  a  bonus. The  original  proposal  was
to reward  managers  of loss  makers  who  reduce  the  losses  by a targeted
amount,  but  MOF  worried  about  having  to  provide  subsidies  in  order  to  pay  a
bonus. As a result  all  IPE  targets  must  show  profits. Furthermore,  the
EAC  sets  a cut  off  point  for  most  IPEs  equivalent  to the  C target  (which  is
usually  equivalent  to the  budget)  and  IPEs  with  profits  which  fall  below
that  point  are  not  usually  rewarded. In addition  some  chronic  money  losers
whose  viability  is  questionable  have  at times  been  excluded  or  dropped  from
the  system.
One  measure  of the  targeting  system  is the  distribution  of the
grades. If information  were  perfect  about  the  technical/engineer  potential
of the  company,  the  future  environment  and  the  optimal  management-14-
techniques,  than  the  only  unknown  wot.ld  be the  degree  to  which  the  system
motivated  staff  to  work  harder  and  better. Under  such  circumstances,  we
might  expect  most  enterprises  to  earn  a C grade. It  would  make  sense  for
the  EAC  to set  targets  so that  the  achievements  fall  in  a normal
distribution  around  the  C grade. In fact,  the  distribution  was  singled
tailed  in  1983-84  with  over  40%  of the  IPEs  in  E grade  and  roughly  equal
shares  in  the  other  grades. In 1984-85  and  1985/86,  the  distributions
become  increasingly  bi-modal  with 35%  in  A and  40%  in E in 1985/86  (see
Table  3).
These  results  reflect  weaknesses  in the  criterion  used  as well  as
imperfect  information.  One  problem  is that  loss-making  companies  are
automatically  assigned  "E"  which  inflates  the  bottom  grade. 5 Another  is
that  the  negotiations  are  dominated  by EAC  generalists  who  have limited
knowledge  of the  workings  of the  IPEs  or of industry  standards  in  other
countries.
l/ The  distributions  are  still  skewed  if  loss  making  companies  are
excluded,  however,  thirty  five  percent  receive  "E"  in  1983-84,  much
larger  than  other  grades. The  next  year  is  bimodal:  34%  in E  and  27%
in  A.  1985/86  becomes  singletailed  toward  the  top:  46%  in "A"  versus
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III.  IMPACT  ON PERFORMANCE
A.  Methodology
To judge the impact  of the system on performance, we looked both
at quantitative  measures and qualitative evidence from interviews  with
managers and officials.  The quantitative assessmiient  relies principally on
a detailed analysis of a sample of 12 enterprises  chosen from the six
larger corporations.  (See  Table 4 for background information on these
companies).  The original intention  was to compare enterprises inside and
outside the system.  Unfortunately, the IPEs outside the system under the
MOP are smaller and tend to  be the worst performers.  The mission was
unable to gather sufficient comparable data on private enterprises to
compare their performance with similar IPEs.  Without this control group we
were unable effectively to isolate the system's impact from other
influences on IPE behavior.  Instead  we attempted to examine other
plausable factors  which could e%-lain any improvement in performance and to
determine  whether these were sufficient to rule out the influence of the
signalling system.-17-
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In  judging  the  sample  enterprises  we looked  at their  periormance
in terms of the main target indicator --  private profits after tax --  and
in terms  of  public  profits  in  constant  prices. Public  profits  in  constant
prices  measures  net real  benefits  --  i.e.,  efficiency  improvements.  It is
the  equivalent  of  a quantum  index  of outputs  minus  a  quantum  index  of
inputs  and  gives  a trend  similar  to  the  trend  in total  factor  productivity.
This  enabled  us to isolate  the  influence  of pricing  on results  and  to  judge
whether  there  had  been  any  efficiency  gain  in  addition  to  any financial
improvements.  Thus  we were  trying  to  answer  two  questions: did  the  system
have  an impact  on private  financial  profits  (its  explicit  target)?  and  on
efficiency  (its  underlying  goal)?
B.  Quantitative  Evidence
Current  Priced  Profits. Incentives  are  awarded  principally  on
the  basis  of private  profits  after  taxes  in  current  prices. On the  basis
of that  indicator  IPE  performance  generally  has improved. Thirty  three
IPEs  were in  the  system  for  its  entire  three  years  of operation,  of which
19 (or  about  58  percent)  improved  their  private  profits  after  tax,  from  100
million  Rupees  in  1982/83  to  617  million  in  1985/86. Fourteen  showed  a
deterioration  from  445  million  Rupees  to 67  million. Thus the  majority  of
these  IPEs  show  an improvement  in the  main  indicator  being  measured  by the
targeting  system. After  3  years  the  total  profits  of the  33 IPEs  in  the
system  was almost  twice  what it  had  been  before  the  system  began:-19-
Table  5:  Summary  of Performance  of IPEs  in System
for  Three  Years:  Profits
(Millions  of  Rupees)
1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86
33 IPEs  in  system  for
three  years.  344.14  467.16  937.81  684.00
19 IPEs  with profit
improvements.  -100.75  221.08  717.45  616.74
14 IPEs  with  profit
deterioration.  444.89  246.08  220.36  67.32
Source: Table  3  of the  Statistical  Appendix.
The sample  enterprises  show  a similar  trend. Five  of the  12
improved  their  profits  after  tax  from  the  system's  introduction  in  1983/84
to 1984/85  and  seven  show  an improvement  to 1985/86  (based  on  unaudited
data  for  1985/86,  see  Graphs  1-12  of the  Statistical  Appendix.) 6
Moreover,  the  sample  enterprises  with  passing  grades  increased  from  6 in
1982/83  to 7 in 1984/85  to 9 in  1985/86  (See  Table  3  of the  Statistical
Appendix).
Constant  Priced  Profits. Of course,  if the  aim is  to improve
efficiency  and  if  efficiency  improvements  are  defined  in  terms  of increases
in  net  real  benefits,  then  increases  in  private  profits  are  not  a good
6/  The five  IPEs  are  Lyallpur  Chemicals,  Javendan  Cement,  Zeal  Pak
Cement,  Pak  Machine  Tool  Factory  (PMTF),  and  National  Refinery  Ltd.
(NRL). The  seven  are  these  five,  plus  Sind  Alkalis  and  Gharibwal
Cement.-20-
measure.  Increases in public profits in constant prices come closer to
indicating efficiency gains for most firms and that is used as a measure of
efficiency improvement in this report. Data on public profits in constant
prices are only available for all the sample for 1980/81 to 1984/85,  which
covers just the first two years of the system's operation.
In 7 of the 12 sample IPEs, public profitability in constant
prices increased  above the 1982/83 level in the first two years of the
system (See  Graphs 1-12).  These seven include four for which the increase
is also an improvement  over past performance (borne  out by comparing real
value added for 1983/84-1984/85  with a trend line based on
1978/79-1982/83):  Sind Alkalis, Lyallpur Chemicals, PMTF, and NRL.  All
four also improved  private profits after tax.  The other three enterprises
in this group improved  efficiency over 1982/83 but were still below their
past trends (Pak  Saudi, Javedan Cement and Millat Tractors).  One company
(Zeal  Pak Cement) shows a sharp deterioration from past efficiency trends
in the first two years of the signalling system.  A scorecard on how the
companies performed on the two indicators --  private profitability after
tax and public profitability in constant prices --  is shown in Table 6.
Some of the enterprises in Table 6 show opposite trends in
private profitability and public profitability at constant prices.  This
occurs, first,  because private profit contains items, such as nonoperating
income, that do not move in parallel  with efficiency gains and that are
excluded from public profits, and second, because of administered prices.-21-
We can  examine  the  first  divergence  --  that  caused  by the
different  definitions  of public  and  private  profits  --  by comparing  the  two
sets  of profits  in  current  prices. For  most  of the  sample  companies  public
profit  is  higher  than  private  profit,  principally  because  of interest  and
Table  6:  Trends  in  Performance  of Sample  IPEs
Compared  to 1982/83  Levels
Private  Profitability  Passing  Grades  Public  Profitability  in
After  Tax  83/84  84/85 85/86  Constant  Prices
Improvements:  Improvements:
Sind  Alkalis*  x  Sind  Alkalis
Lyallpur  Chemicals  x  x  x  Lyallpur  Chemical
Javedan  Cement  x  Javedan  Cement  (below
trend)
Gharibwal  Cement*  x  x  x
Zeal  Pak  Cement  x  x  x
PMTF  x  PMTF**
NRL  x  x  x  NRL
Deterioration:
Pak  Saudi  x  x  x  Pak  Saudi  (below  trend)**
Millat  Tractors  x  x  n.a.  Millat  Tractors  (below
trend)
Deterioration:
HMC  x  HMC
Gharibwal  Cement
Pakistan  Engineering  x  Pakistan  Engineering
Ravi  Rayon  x  x  Ravi  Rayon
*  Improvement  in 1985/86  only.
**  Improvement  in 1984/85  only.
depreciation.  Since  most  of the  present  managers  had little  influence  over
the  initial  investment  decisions,  private  profit  penalizes  some  managers
for  factors  they  cannot  control. If  the  high  capital  charges  resulting
from  government's  investment  decision  make it impossible  for  them  to earn  a
passing  grade,  the  system  will  provide  no incentive  for  them  to improve
factors  they  can  control. At the  same  time  private  profit  also  fails  to-22-
motivate managers to use wisely factors they can control by not measuring
these items, notably working capital.  And the inclusion  of non-operating
income allows an enterprise to achieve its targets thanks to windfall
income that has little or nothing to do with efficiency.  For example,
three of the 12 sample IPEs had public profits in current prices that were
lower than private profits in 1984/85; in fact public profits were
negative.  In two cases (PECO,  and PMTF) this  was due to the opportunity
cost of working capital, which exceeded profits even when interest  payments
and depreciation were added back in.  In fact PECO went from E to C grade,
despite a large build up in accounts receivable, thanks to government debt
relief in the form of other financial income.  The most extreme example of
the distortions that can be caused by using private profitability as a
target occurred in the case of HMC, which made the  A grade in 1984/85 only
because of other income (principally, interest  on deferred credits on sales
overseas).
In most of the sample firms, the difference between public and
private profits is in the level of profits not the trend.  With the
exception of PECO, the trends in public (current  priced) and private
profitability do not dramatically diverge.  The trends in current and
constant priced profits do differ sharply for most companies, showing that
prices are the main reason for the differences in the first and last
columns of Table 6 (see  below).
Explanation of the Sample's Performance
As mentioned, since it is impossible to establish a clear
causality between the performance changes and the signalling system, we-23-
tried  to  consider  all  other  possible  explanations  of  performance  to see  if
they  left  room  for  the  system  as a factor. The  main  explanations  include:
(i)  changes  in  pri-es;  (ii)  changes  in  the  macroeconomic  environment;  (iii)
changes  in  markets;  (iv)  changes  in  IPE  liquidity  positions;  (v)  changes  in
management  due  to  changes  in the  supervisory  environment  of the  IPEs  and/or
the  signalling  system. Other  possible  explanations  which  were rejected
because  they  do  not fit  with the  circumstances  are:  a drop  or rise  in
labor  unrest  (no  significant  change  occurred);  improvement  or deterioration
in  the  supply  of inputs  or services  such  as  electricity,  water,  transport
(IPEs  experiencing  problems  saw  little  change);  technology  change  (there
were  no significant  changes  in  the  technology  used in  the  sample
enterprises  during  this  period). Changes  in liquidity  was  another
explanation  that  was  considered  and  rejected. Levels  of liquidity  are low
in  most  of the  sample  firms  and  showed  little  improvement  during  1983/84  or
1984/85.  (See  Table  16  of the  Statistical  Appendix.).
Additions  to  capacity  were  also  not  significant  during  this
period: it  was  government's  policy  to  curb  new investment  in  the  IPEs.
Only two  IPEs  show  any  major  increase  in  fixed  operating  assets  at constant
prices  from  1982/83  to 1984/85: Millat  Tractors  and  NRL. Assets  of the
other  IPEs  rose  by only  2.7  percent  on average  during  this  period. In the
event,  capacity  change  is corrected  for  by including  fixed  operating  assets
in  the  denominator  of public  profitability.  (Millat  Tractors  and  NRL  show
a deterioration  in  public  profitability  in  both current  and  constant  prices
in  the  years  when fixed  operating  assets  increased  more  than  profits).-24-
Changes  in  Prices
The prices of four of the corporations under the MOP --  cement,
fertilizer,  petroleum  and  automobiles  --  are  administered.  Moreover,  quite
a few  of the  companies  are  buying  inputs,  such  as petroleum  or electricity,
at prices  which  do not  reflect  the  true  costs  of production  to  society. As
Graphs  1-12  show,  the  level  of public  profitability  in constant  prices
diverges  widely  from  public  profitability  in  current  prices  for  most  of the
sample  IPEs. In six  cases  the  IPEs  show  the  opposite  trend  in current
prices  from  the  constant  price  trend. In two  of these  the  price  effect  is
positive: increases  in  administered  prices  explain  why  Gharibwal  and  Zeal
Pak  Cement  could  improve  their  financial  profits  while  efficiency
deteriorated.  Prices  had  the  opposite  effect  on Pak  Saudi  Fertilizer  and
Millat  Tractors,  which  showed  modest  improvements  in  efficiency  that  were
cancelled  by adverse  price  effects. In  1983/84  HMC  also  improved  its
constant  priced  profits  while  its  current  priced  profits  declined. In this
case,  it  was  because  the  company's  market  for  higher  priced  products  (such
as turnkey  cement  plants)  deteriorated  and  HMC  shifted  into  lower  value
items  such  as galvanized  steel  structures.
Pricing  has  clearly  affected  the  extent  to  which  targets  reflect
efficiency.  For  the  two  years  for  which  constant  priced  figures  are
available  (1983/84  and  1984/85)  the  probable  grade  of the  sample  companies
based  on  public  profits  in  constant  prices  differed  from  the  actual  grade
awarded  in 14 (out  of 24)  cases. For  example,  Lyallpur  Chemicals  made a  C
in  1983/84  on its  private  profitability  target,  but  would  probably  have-25-
been an  A company  in  constant  prices. The  following  year it  was an  A
company  but  would  probably  have  made  a C in  constant  prices.
The EAC  has  made  some  effort  to  adjust  its  targets  for
administered  prices. For  example,  the  achievements  of two  sectors  with
administered  prices,  cement  and  fertilizer,  are  calculated  on the  basis  of
the  budgeted  (the  so called  retention)  price  that  was  used to  determine  the
original  target,  even  through  the  actual  retention  price  given  to the
company  was  higher. This,  however,  only  corrects  for  the  pricing  problem
on the  output  side,  not  the  input  side. The  EAC  has  also  added  some
nonprofit  targets  but these  do not  appear  to  have improved  the  capacity  of
the  system  to  measure  efficiency.  For  example,  Zeal  Pak  Cement  earned  a C
grade  in 1983/84  on a combined  target  of private  profitability  (40%)  and
volume  of  production  (60%);  it  earned  an A grade  in 1984/85  on a target  of
profitability  (60%);  production  volume  (30%)  and  productivity  (10%).  In
contrast,  Zeal  Pak's  efficiency  (public  profitability  in  constant  prices)
fell  sharply  in 1983/84  (a  3% increase  in  output  was  offset  by a  60%
increase  in inputs  in  constant  prices)  and  stayed  about  the  same  in
1985/86.
In summary,  pricing  changes  explain  the  trend  in  financial
profits  (both  up-and  downwards)  in  six  cases,  but  not the  efficiency
changes.-26-
Changes  in  Markets
Competition  could  explain  an improvement  in  profits  and
efficiency  if the  IPEs  react  to competitive  pressures  by working  harder  to
cut  costs,  expand  production,  improve  quality,  etc.  in  order  to retain  or
expand  their  markets. If,  in  contrast,  the  IPE  cannot  or  will  not respond,
the  result  will  be a deterioration  in  performance.  Competition  increased
in  Pakistan  during  the  period  under  review,  thanks  to trade  liberalization,
easier  private  entry  into  previously  public  activities,  and  the  earmarking
of credit  for  the  private  sector. And  competition  has  had  a favorable
impact  on some  public  firms  which  are  striving  hard to improve  efficiency
and  retain  their  market. (Petro  Carbon,  which  is  not  part  of the  sample,
is  an example.) However,  competitive  pressure  does  r.3t  seem  to  be the  main
explanation  for  the  efficiency  improvements  in  the  sample  firms. Some  of
these  firms,  such  as HMC  or PECO,  have faced  competition  since  before  the
period  under  examination.  Others,  such  as the  fertilizer  plants  and  the
refinery,  faced  no change  in  competition  but  nonetheless  showed  efficiency
gains. In  most  cases  where  IPEs  have faced  an increase  in  competition  the
result  during  the  short  period  under  examination  has  been  a deterioration
in  performance.
An example  is  cement. Pakland  Cement,  a private  cement  plant,
began  operations  in 1982/83  and  immediately  established  new standards  of
quality  control,  marketing  and  timely  delivery. Pakland's  nearest  IPE
competitor,  Javedan  Cement,  improved  efficiency  in the  period  under  review
although  it  is still  below  past trends. The  other  two  cement  plants  in  the-27-
sample,  however,  showed  declines  in  efficiency.  The  public  cement  plants
have  a long  history  of  operating  in  segmented  markets  and  it  may take  time
for  them  to  react  to competition  by improving  efficiency.  Moreover,  for
competition  to  have  a  positive  impact  on efficiency  the  enterprise  must
have  management  with  the  capacity,  autonomy  and  capital  base  to respond.
This is  often  not  the  case  for  the  IPEs;  autonomy  in  particular  may  be
insufficient  (See  Section  D.)
In addition,  liberalization  has  shifted  demand  in  ways that  make
it  difficult  or impossible  for  the  IPE  to  respond. An example  of this  is
Ravi  Rayon,  a  poor  performer  in  both  current  and  constant  prices. Ravi
Rayon  has  been  having  trouble  for  some  time  competing  with polyester  and
its  problem  worsened  with liberalized  imports  of  viscose  (a  direct
substitute  for  rayon).
In  sum,  increased  competition  is  not  a  major  factor  explaining
the  improvements  in  efficiency  but  it is  a reason  for  the  deterioration  in
results  in  some  cases. Since  it is  the  improvement  in  performance  that
most interests  us,  we must  look  for  other  explanations.
Macroeconomic  Changes
Changes  in  the  macroeconomic  environment  could  explain  some  of
the  performance  trends. The  first  year  of  operation  of the  signalling
system,  1983/84,  was  not  a buoyant  one  for  the  economy;  GDP  grew  by 4.4
percent  in real  terms  which  is  well  below  the  average  of about  7  percent  in
the  1970s  and  early  1980s. GDP  grew  by 8.8  percent  in the  second  year  of-28-
the  system,  1984/85. The  trend  in  public  profits,  however,  are  not  well
correlated  with  the  movement  in  CDP.  Only  three  (Pak  Saudi  Fertilizer,
Javedan  Cement,  and  Pak  Machine  Tools)  show  a slack  growth  in  constant
priced  profits  in  1983/84  and  an acceleration  in 1984/85.
On the  other  hand,  the  easing  of import  restrictions,  reflecte'
in  a 22  percent  real  growth  in imports  in 1983/84  and  7.1  percent  in
1984/85  could  be a more  important  explanation.  For  those  IPEs  which  are
supply,  not demand,  constrained,  greater  access  to imports  could  make  a
real  difference  in their  output. This  explanation  does  not  suffice,
however,  because  most  IPEs  lack  the  capital  to take  advantage  of import
opportunities  (see  below).
Changes  in  Management
In  several  of the  sample  companies,  the  improvement  in
performance  seems  to  be explained  in  large  part  by management  changes.
This  is  especially  true  for  the  four  companies  which  show  efficiency  gains
above  their  past  trends. Probably  much  of the  improvement  in  the
performance  of Sind  Alkalis  can  be attributed  to  a change  in  the  management
team  at the  start  of the  period. In  other  cases  the  same  managers  strove
harder  to  curb  costs  and  expand  output.
For  example,  Sind  Alkalis  increased  its  soda  ash  capacity
utilization  from  38 to 90  percent;  productivity  improved  sharply  (see
Graphs  13-25  of the  Statistical  Appendix);  the  volume  of  production  went  up
140  percent;  and  gas  consumption  declined. Lyallpur  Chemicals  and-29-
Fertilizer  is  already  above  rated  capacity  and  managed  to increase
utilization  still  further  while  curbing  raw  material  and fuel  consumption.
PMTF  also improved  capacity  use  somewhat  and  coped  with stagnant  demand  by
shifting  production;  it  also  registered  a sharp  increase  in  productivity.
The  Refinery,  always  a good  performer,  increased  its  inventory  turnover  and
kept  energy  consumption  in  check.
An important  reason  for  management's  greater  attention  to
efficiency  is the  general  "hardening"  of the  environment  for  IPEs  during
this  period,  of which  the  signalling  system  is  only  a component. Top
authorities  were  reacting  to  performance  indicators  (many  of  which  w'ere
being  calculated  well  before  the  signalling  system)  with  new  seriousness
and  demanding  explanations.  Managers  we.e  being  fired  for  mismanagement.
Subsidies  and  easy  access  to  credit  were  curbed. IPE  investment  funds  were
being  sharply  curtailed.  The installation  of the  signalling  system  was
itself  part  of this  trend. It is  hard to  separate  these  environmental
changes  from  the  performance  system  in order  to  judge  to  what extent  the
harder  environment  by itself  was  responsible  for  the  efficiency  gains. It
does  seem  likely  that  the  signalling  system  alone,  without  these
environmental  changes,  would  not  have  been  sufficient  to  create  the
efficiency  improvements.
Conclusion
The  argument  that  the  efficiency  improvements  were  partly  due  to
the  system  cannot  be ruled  out  since  none  of ,he  other  explanations  fully
explain  the  ef iciency  improvement.  However,  it is  not  fully  persuasive-30-
because  the  targeting  system  is  not  really  measuring  efficiency  and  the
system  is  operating  under  a  number  of constraints  on its  capacity  to affect
change. (See  Section  D  below.) Nevertheless,  the  system  may  still  be
influencing  efficiency  even  though  it is  not  effectively  measuring  it.
Managers  motivated  to increase  profits,  particularly  public  enterprise
managers,  have  only  so  many  ways to  react. Most  of the  sample  enterprises
are  not  in  a position  to  change  prices  or to increase  transfers.
Increasing  the  quantity  of  output  or reducing  the  quantity  of inputs  may  be
one  of the  few  ways  they  can  react  to a  profitability  target. Such  a
reaction  seems  especially  likely  in  the  first  years  of a performance
evaluation  system,  before  managers  become  cynical  about  the  flaws  in the
indicators  or figure  out  ways to  achieve  targets  without  improving
efficiency.
An important  feature  of the  system's  impact  is  the  fact  that  it
was  part  of the  general  policy  changes  mentioned  above. The  qualitative
evidence  described  below  suggests  that  the  system  provided  managers  with  an
added  incentive  to  respond  to these  changes  as  well  as a tool  to rally  and
motivate  staff. In  sum,  the  system  despite  its  flaws  seems  to  have  had  a
positive  impact  on efficiency,  an impact  that  is intimately  linked  to the
other  changes  in the  IPE  managerial  environment.
C.  Qualitative  Evidence
Most  managers  consulted  felt  that  the  system  had  had  a positive
impact  on  performance,  as  did  government  officials. They  attributed  this-31-
not  only  to the  targets  and  bonuses,  but  also  to  a number  of other,
parallel  features  of the  system: the  systematic  gathering  and  processing
of information  on  performance,  the  serious  discussions  of performance  in
the  negotiations  and  review  meetings,  and  the  resulting  better
understanding  of the  enterprises  in  the  Ministry  of  Production.
The targeting  and  bonus  system  was  cited  by all  managers
consulted,  even  those  critical  of the  system  and  those  not  receiving
bonuses,  as a positive  development  which  could  be a powerful  motivation  if
properly  handled. Managers  of companies  which  had received  the  bonus
maintained  that  their  staff  was  very  aware  of the  target  and  knew  what  they
and  their  department  would  have  to  do on a  daily  and  monthly  basis  to
achieve  the  A target. SInce  the  C target  is  the  same  as the  budget  for
most  companies  and the  A and  B targets  are  typically  5  and 10  percent  above
that  level,  it is fairly  simple  for  the  IPEs  to  convert  their  budgets  into
targets. Judging  from  the  enterprises  visited,  Pakistan's  IPEs  have
thorough  management  information  systems. Budget  achievement  and  other
indicators  are  monitored  on a  quarterly,  monthly,  weekly  and  daily  basis
for  each  work  unit.  Under  such  circumstances  it is  plausible  that  staff
could  know  what the  target  means  for  their  unit  and  where  they  stand  in
achieving  the  goal  during  the  year.
Even  companies  which  have  not  achieved  the  target  in  the  past
seem  to  be influenced  by the  signalling  system. Petro  Carbon,  for  example,
is  attempting  to compete  against  imports  of carbon  black  in  a limited
market. It is  a small  scale,  inefficient  producer  that  had  accumulated-32-
R/75  million  in losses  over  seven  years. Nevertheless,  thanks  to
aggressive  management  and,  according  to  management,  motivation  to receive
the  bonus,  the  company  converted  its  R/9  million  loss  in 1984/85  to  a R/7.5
million  profit  in  1985/86,  brought  down  average  production  costs  from
R/16,000/ton  to  R/9000/ton  and  expects  to  earn  an A grade.
The  MOP  has  long  produced  a  great  deal  of information  on its
IPEs. The  difference  introauced  by the  signa'.ling  system  is that  the
information  centers  around  a few  key indicators  that  are  being  monitored.
This  allows  decision  makers  to  focus  on achievements  plus  a few  explanatory
variables  and  helps  make  sense  of a flood  of  data.  Furthermore,  it  uses  on
a  weighted  comprehensive  indicator  (private  profitability)  which  reduces
the  distortions  caused  by partial  indicators.  In  addition,  information  is
now  arriving  in a  more  timely  fashion.  Audited  reports  used  to  be received
by MOP  one  to two  years  after  the  end  of a fiscal  year.  Since  the
incentive  has  been linked  to receipt  of audited  reports  they  arrive  on
average  within  five  months,  or  at most  seven. Furthermore,  there  is  more
serious  follow  up to  auditors'  comments. If,  for  example,  the  auditors'
report  states  that  they  were "unable  to  verify  inventories,"  a team  is sent
from  the  Ministry  to investigate  and  in  extreme  cases  the  manager  has  been
fired. Finally,  the  kind  of  assessment  that  was done  in  section  A above  of
the  improvement  in  efficiency  and  its  probable  causes  would  not  have  been
possible  before  the  signalling  system.-33-
Another  important  change  is  that  targets  are  now  negotiated
rather  than  set  from  above. This  plus  the  fact  that  the  target  means
something  substantial  now --  a  bonus  --  causes  management  to treat  targets
more  seriously. Targeting  is  more  rational  and  realistic  and  management
understands  the  reasons  for  the  target  and,  with  some  exceptions,  has
agreed  to  the  goal.  The  main  exceptions  are  the  money  losing  firms  that  do
not stand  a chance  of achieving  a  profit  target. Several  of these  have
refused  to sign  the  agreement.
All enterprises  meet  regularly  (at  least  twice  a year)  with the
Secretary  of Production,  the  head  of their  corporation  and  the  other  MDs  in
the  corporation.  The EAC  prepares  an agenda  which  is  circulated
beforehand. These  meetings  always  begin  by following  up on any  issues
raised  during  the  previous  meeting. In  particular  the  Secretary  reports  on
any  commitment  he undertook  (usually  w,th  regard  to  negotiations  with other
ministries)  and the  MDs report  on any  responsibilities  or improvements  in
performance  that  they  pledged  to achieve  in the  previous  meeting. The
discussions  center  around  a comparison  of  budgeted  and  actual  performance
provided  by the  EAC. After  the  meeting  the  EAC  prepares  minutes. Managers
regard  being  called  upon  to report  on  performance  before  the  Secretary  and
their  fellow  managers  as effective  in  motivating  them  to  do  better  and in
informing  the  Secretary  of their  situation  and  problems. It also  helps
them  understand  their  standing  vis-a-vis  the  other  IPEs  in  their
corporation.-34-
D.  Constraints  on the  System's  Impact
Besides  the  fact  the  targets  are  an imperfect  reflection  of
efficiency,  there  are  a  number  of factors  which  could  constrain  the
system's  impact  on  public  enterprise  efficiency:
(1)  The rewards  are  not  sufficiently  large  or  distributed  in
such  a way  as to  motiva.e  performance  improvements;
(2)  Managers  lack  sufficient  autonomy  to change  performance;
(3)  Managers  are  not  competent  to  respond  to rewards  with
changes  in  performance;
4)Some  PEs  are  excluded  from  the  system;  and
(5)  The  macroeconomic  environment  is  not  conducive  to
performance  improvements.
To some  extent  all  of these  constraints  are  operating  in  Pakistan.
Failure  to  Motivate  Efficiency  Improvements
Most  managers  consulted  think  that  the  size  of the  bonus  is
sufficient  to  motivate  their  staff. Nonunionized  staff  have  not  been
receiving  bonuses  in  recent  years  and  the  prospect  of a  bonus  is  seen  as an
inducement.  Not surprisingly,  if  the  firm  has  once  received  a  bonus,  the
motivation  to  keep  or increase  the  bonus  the  following  year  is stronger
than  if the  firm  has  never  received  a  bonus. In contrast,  a senior  staff
member  of one  money  losing  firm  was  not  even  aware  of the  existence  of the
signalling  system. Lower  level  staff  of one  IPE  that  made the  A grade  only
because  of nonoperating  income  were  also  not  aware  of the  target.-35-
The  way the  bonuses  are  distributed  may reduce  the  incentive
impact. The  bonus  is  meant  to  be a  management  tool  that  enables  managers
to encourage  productivity  improvements  by rewarding  better  performers. The
way the  system  is  administered  in Pakistan  has reduced  managerial
flexibility. First,  all  nonunionized  staff  of an  A grade  firm  receive
three  months  of salary  across  the  board. Some  managers  reward  lower  or no
bonuses  to a few  individuals  that  receive  a  below  average  merit  rating  (all
firms  consulted  have  some  sort  of individual  performance  evaluation
system);  others  did  not  realize  that  they  could  reduce  the  award. But
managers  cannot  raise  the  award  for  an above  average  individual,  nor  can
they  distinguish  between  units  or departments  on the  basis  of their
performance. It  was  originally  proposed  that  managers  be given  complete
discretion  in  awarding  bonuses,  but this  was  dropped  in the  face  of
opposition  from  MOP,  corporations  and  some  managers. Second,  unionized
staff  receive  a  bonus (the  level  is  decided  by the  government)  regardless
of  whether  the  firm  achieved  its  target  (and  with  no differentiation  among
workers  on the  basis  of merit). Typically  the  bonus  for  unionized  workers
is a  higher  multiple  (7  to 10  months  were  cited)  than  the  bonus  awarded  to
nonunionized  staff.  (MOP  is  considering  linking  workers'  bonuses  more  to
the  unit's  performance  through  the  collective  bargaining  process. Third,
the  bonus  under  the  system  is  usually  awarded  six  months  after  the  end  of
the  fiscal  year,  which  reduces  its  incentive  impact  on the  following  year,
but provides  an incentive  for  firms  to  submit  their  audited  accounts.
Lack  of  Management  Autonomy  to  Affect  Efficiency
The  main  constraints  on management's  capacity  to  increase
operating  efficiency  are:-36-
(i)  Inability  to lay  off  labor  to  cut  costs;
ii) Lack  of control  over  compensation  decisions;
(iii) Inability  to close  lines  or  cut  off  service  to cut
costs;
(iv) Constraints  on flexibility  in  procurement  decisions;
(v)  Constraints  on choice  of  product  mix,  markets  and
suppliers;
(vi) Lack  of flexibility  in  expenditures  requiring  credit  or
foreign  exchange;
(vii) Need  to  meet  government  imposed  social  welfare
objectives;  and
(viii) Inherited  capital  stock.
The first  three  issues  are  all  related  to  the  power  of unionized
labor  in  Pakistan. The  MOP  has taken  steps  to  decentralize  some  personnel
decisions  to the  corporations  and  enterprises,  such  as disciplinary
firings,  promotions,  and  compensation  decisions  in  collective  bargaining.
Reductions  in  force,  however,  are  virtually  impossible,  so  managers  cannot
cut  costs  by laying  off  workers  and  closing  lines  or plants. (The  lack  of
flexibility  in  the  labor  force  is illustrated  for  the  sample  IPEs  in graphs
15 through  36 of the  Statistical  Appendix.)  Managers  also  have limited
flexibility  in  controlling  compensation.  Individual  managers  can  be
faulted  for  a tendency  to  give  in to  labor  demands  in  co'.lective
bargaining,  a common  trait  in  public  enterprise  management  where  there  is
cost  plus  pricing,  easy  access  to  subsidies  or cheap  credit. But  this
tendency  is  also  a reflection  of  a pervasive  attitude  throughout  the  public
sector  and  a long  history  of union  power  in  the  public  enterprises. The
government-enforced  bonus  system  for  unionized  workers  further  reduces-37-
managerial  control  over  labor  costs. Because  of this,  increases  in the
wage  bill  bear  little  relationship  to  productivity  increases,  (as  graphs  25
through  36  of the  Statistical  Appendix  show  for  the  sample  IPEs). This
situation  appears  to  have gotten  worse  during  the  period  under  review;  with
one  exception  (Sind  Alkalis)  all the  sample  enterprises  show  faster
increases  in average  labor  costs  than  in  productivity  during
1983/84-1984/85.  In  comparison,  the  majority  of the  firms  show
productivity  increasing  faster  than  labor  costs  from  1980/81-1981/82.
A similar  situation  seems  to  pertain  throughout  the  MOP:
Table  7:  Comparison  of  Labor  Costs  and
Productivity  Increases;  All IPEs
Under  the  Ministry  of Production
(%  Change)
82-83/  83-84/  84-85/
81-82  82-83  83-84
MANPOWER  -1.1  10.6  0.2
TOTAL  LABOR  13.6  19.0  14.2
AVERAGE  LABOR  COSTS  14.8  7.5  13.9
PRODUCTION  /a  18.6  9.4  5.9
PRODUCTIVITY  19.8  -0.1  6.7
a/  At constant  1977/78  prices.
Source: EAC
This situation  appears  to  be changing. The  MOP  has  become
concerned  about  rising  labor  costs  and  has  begun  to  stress  measures  to cut
costs. Managers  are  now  being  asked  to  bargain  for  reasonable  wage  level.
and  cut  costs  in  overtime,  bonuses  and  the  like.-38-
Procurement  procedures  also  reduce  management's  flexibility  in
cutting  costs  or seeking  new  technology.  For  example,  HMC,  which  produces
heavy  equipment,  including  turnkey  sugar  and  cement  plants,  must  consult
its  corporation  for  all  purchases  over  about  $12,000  and  if the  item  is  a
capital  good  it  must  go for  competitive  bidding  (raw  material  purchases
over  about  $118,000  must  also  go for  competitive  bidding). This  requires
an advertisement,  45 days  for  placement  of  bids,  and  40 days  for  study  and
selection.  The  firm  is  expected  to accept  the  lowest  bid.  Purchases  over
$600,000  must  be approved  by a ministerial  committee  and  purchases  over
about  $3  million  must  be approved  by the  a high  level  committee  of the
cabinet  and  approval  can  take  two  years. Thus,  even  if  managers  feel
motivated  to seek  out  lower  cost  inputs  or to  develop  new  methods  of
operation  or  product  lines,  they  must  deal  with  a sometimes  lengthy
bureaucratic  procedure  that  can  stifle  new  initiatives  or force  the  firm  to
miss  opportunities.
Some  of the  firms  are  also  constrained  in their  choice  of
markets,  products  and  suppliers.  Not  surprisingly,  import  substituting
enterprises  (like  the  Refinery)  must  satisfy  uomestic  demand  before
exporting. The  Pak  Suzuki  automobile  company  is  required  to  produce  a
certain  number  of its  lowest  priced  passenger  cars  and  to purchase  a
portion  of its  inputs  from  another  state  enterprise. It is  hard  to judge
if  this  is  a constraint,  since  most  managers  are  not aggressively  seeking
new  markets  and  adapting  product  mix. Years  of operating  in  a controlled
environment  has  made  them  complacent  even  in the  face  of rising
competition.-39-
Government  imposed  social  welfare  objectives  place  another  burden
on the  IPE  that  reduces  management's  flexibility  to  cut  costs. For  example
Pak  Machine  Tools  is  required  to train  five  people  for  _-ry  one  they
intend  to  hire.  Plants  located  in  remote  areas  at government  behest  have
to  provide  education,  housing,  health  services  and  transportation  to
employees  as  well  as bear  added  transport  costs.
The  operations  of the  finanAal system  are  another  constraint  on
management. Credit  and foreign  exchange  ceilings  are  allocated  as part  of
the  budgetary  process  through  negotiations  betweeti  Lirst,  the  corporations,
the  Ministry  of Production  and  the  Ministry  of Finance,  and  then  between
the  corporations  and  the  companies. There  is  no reason  why thece  ceilings
would  tend  to favor  the  more  efficient  firms,  especially  since  price
distortions  make  it  hard to  judge  efficiency. In  other  words,  the  more
efficient  enterprise  may  not  be the  most  profitable  one,  and  a manager
intent  on improving  efficiency  may  lack  sufficient  liquidity  or foreign
exchange  to  make  expenditures  with  high  rates  of return. A related
constraint  is the  fact  that  IPE  managers  cannot  get  coverage  for  their
foreign  exchange  purchases  even  though  private  enterprises  have  this
facility  in  Pakistan.
Finally,  management  is  constrained  by the  inherited  capital
stock. Management  can  still  improve  operating  efficiency  within  that
constraint,  but the  task  can  be considerably  harder  when  the  plant  is
grossly  under  or oversized  or the  equipment  is  antiquated  and  worn  out.-40-
Lack  of Management  ComRetency  to  Affect  Efficiency
A danger  in  many  developing  countries  is  that  PE  managers  lack
the  competency  to  understand  the  efficiency  target  or to improve  efficiency
in  the  face  of the  target. Pakistan  is fortunate  in  having  IPE  managers
who  seem  generally  skilled  and  competent. Nevertheless,  these  managers  and
their  staff  have  been  accustomed  to  operate  in  a  protected  environment
without  the  pressures  for  efficiency  that  the  signalling  system  is supposed
to  provide. If the  system  were to  try  to  motivate  managers  on the  basis  of
public  profitability,  managers  would  need  to  be trained  in the  rationale  of
the  profit  adjustments.  Some  may  also  need training  and  assistance  in
areas  that  have  not  been  so important  in the  past,  such  as in identifying
cost  cutting  measures,  in  marketing,  and  in  planning. Deregulation  and  the
pressureb  for  efficiency  from  the  EAC  have  created  new incentives  for
managers  to  acquire  these  skills.
Exclusion  of some  PEs  from  the  System
In 1985/86  the  incentive  system  was  applied  to 51  of the  MOP's  66
enterprises.  The  excluded  enterprises  were  mostly  small  in terms  of
assets,  employment  and  revenues  (most  of the  small  firms  under  the  Pakistan
Industrial  Development  Corporation  are  excluded). In 1987-88  all  the  MOP
firms  are included  in the  system. But  the  coverage  is in fact  not  complete
since  loss  making  enterprises  are  in  effect  excluded  from  the  system  in
Pakistan. Managers  of such  enterprises  tend  to  become  demoralized  if  they
feel  the  target  is  not  a realistic  one.  Some  six  enterprises  made  losses-41-
throughout  the  three  years  of the  system  i  A  could  be considered  to  be, in
effect,  excluded  from  the  system. This  would  mean that  45 IPEs  were
covered  by the  system  in 1985/86,  or 64  percent  of the  total.
Macroeconomic  Environment
Finally  there  may  be exogenous  factors  which  constrain  efficiency
gains. Depressed  demand,  shortages  of inputs,  weaknesses  in the
infrastructure,  and  the  like  can  all  make it  difficult  for  managers  to
effect  changes. These  factors  certainly  operate  in Pakistan. For  example,
many  of the  IPEs  suffered  because  of power  shortages  during  this  period;
Millat  Tractors  faced  a  drop  in demand  because  the  Agricultural  Development
Bank  provided  inadequate  funds  for  farmers  to  buy  tractors. PECO  suffered
when the  Electricity  Company  cancelled  an order  for  towers. Yet  despite
such  problems  the  majority  of the  sample  firms  were  still  able  to improve
their  efficiency.
E.  Perverse  Effects  on Performance
Performance  evaluation  systems  could  motivate  short  term
improvements  in  profitability  and  yet  have  a  perverse  effect  on long  term
performance.  The  design  of the  Pakistani  system  took  into  account  the  fact
that  if the  targets  were  solely  based  on short  run  measures,  there  would  be
a tendency  to sacrifice  expenditures  with short  run  costs  and  only  long  run
benefits. This  tendency  could  be expected  to  be a  problem  in  Pakistan,
where  the  average  tenure  of an IPE  manager  is  estimated  to  be about  three
years. Nevertheless,  it  was  quite  rightly  decided  to  begin  with  a simpler-42-
system  based  on short  run  targets  only  and  to  add  targets  for  items  like
maintenance  or training,  and  dynamic  indicators,  such  as investment  and  R
and  D, as the  system  matures  and  the  short-run  targeting  system  is  working
well.  MOP is  also  in the  process  of introducing  corporate  planning  for  all
IPEs  (and  a qualitative  measure  of corporate  planning  will  be included  in
the  targets  eventually).
There  is  some  evidence  that  the  lack  of any  longer  term  target
might  already  have  had  an impact  on performance.  For  example,  one  of the
sample  firms  (Charibwal  Cement)  achieved  a B grade  partly  because  it  did
not  carry  out its  budgeted  repair  and  maintenance  program  and  hence  worked
316  instead  of 300  days  a  year.  Several  managers  also  worried  that  their
targets  were  based  at full  or more  than  full  capacity  operation  without
enough  provision  for  more  than  routine  maintenance. EAC  makes  an  effort  to
assure  that  the  targets  are  realistic  and  allow  for  preventive  maintenance
and  also  will readjust  the  target  if  there  is  some  unforseeable  and
unpreventable  problem. At the  time  of the  evaluation  EAC  checks  that  the
IPE  has  adhered  to the  agreed  maintenance  schedule.
IV.  IMPACT  OF THE  SYSTEM  ON GOVERNMENT  POLICY
A.  Impact  on the  Regulatory  Environment  and  Pricing
The  signalling  system  gets  its  name from  the  notion  that  it  will
signal managers about the  behavior that government desires --  and
government  about  the  effects  of its  policy  on performance.  Of course  the-43-
first  set  of signals  is  the  primary  purpose  of the  system,  but the  second
set  could  be even  more important  if government  policy  is the  primary
determinant  of performance.  In theory  the  system  signals  the  need for
regulatory  reform  through  the  adiustments  that  have  to  be made in the
targets  to take  account  of government  imposed  costs,  lack  of  managerial
autonomy  and  the  like.  Proponents  of the  system  maintain  that  by making
these  adjustments  explicit  the  system  highlights  the  cost  of distortions,
helping  government  to  make  a  conscious  choice. Furthermore,  even  if  policy
reforms  do  not  ensue,  the  system  motivates  managers  to  operate  at greater
efficiency  within  the  degrees  of freedom  they  are  given;  lack  of autonomy
is  not  accepted  as  a  blanket  excuse  for  inefficiency.  Critics  of the
system  argue  that  by adjusting  for  these  problems,  the  signalling  system
actually  makes  it  easier  for  government  to ignore  tbem.  Instead  of
promoting  reform  the  system  hinders  or delays  it. The  same  criticism  is
made  of price  adjustments;  by adjusting  targets  for  price  distortions  the
system  reduces  the  pressure  to remove  the  distortion.  But this  is only
true  in so far  as a  move to  efficiency  prices  would  work in favor  of the
manager,  a situation  that  does  not  appear  to  pertain  to Pakistan. In the
past  IPE  managers  were  not  held  to efficiency  targets  --  nor  were they
lobbyists  for  reform.
The  main  constraints  on the  IPEs  mentioned  earlier  all  entail  a
cost.  Since  these  costs  are typically  not  directly  felt  by Government
--they  either  take  the  form  of foregone  taxes  or dividends  or  higher  prices
to  consumers  --  there  is  a tendency  for  the  trade  offs  never  to  be
considered.-44-
The  EAC  has  not  often  used  its  information  base to  promote
regulatory  reform. One  exception  is  a study  of labor  costs  that  can  be
expected  to increase  presssures  for  wage  restraint.  The  EAC  adjusts
targets  to  take  into  account  the  constraints  on enterprises  during  the
negotiations,  but  no formal  calculation  of the  costs  implied  by these
adjustments  is  made.  For  example,  the  cost  to  an IPE  of  not  being
permitted  by government  to  make  a  necessary  replacement  investment  in  a
timely  fashion  would  be explicitly  calculated  for  target  setting  purposes
but  would  not  be analyzed  elsewhere. The  costs  of other  constraints,  such
as  not  being  able  to lay  off  redundant  workers,  are  treated  as a normal
cost  of  doing  business  and  no adjustment  is  made  to the  target. The  costs
of  meeting  government  imposed  social  objectives  would  not  be calculated
unless  these  change  considerably  from  year  to  year.  Thus,  the  cost  of
training  more  people  every  year  than  an IPE  could  possibly  employ  would  not
be explicity  estimated  because  such  costs  don't  significantly  affect  the
trend  in  operating  efficiency.  The  EAC  does  produce  a diagnostic  report  at
the  end  of the  year  which  assess  each  unit's  real  performance  and  can  form
the  basis  for  follow-up  studies.
Nor  has  the  system  been  used  to illustrate  the  financial  impact
of pricing  or other  policy  changes,  either  at the  enterprise  or the
aggregate  level. It  would  be fairly  simple  to  do simulation  exercises  to
estimate  the  impact  of  changas  in  wages,  foreign  exchange,  electricity
prices,  etc.  on each  public  enterprise  and  on the  group.
The EAC  was  set  up for,  and  is  more  effective  at,  influencing
management  rather  than  Government. Further,  the  decisions  about  many  of-45-
these  policies  are  not in  the  hands  of the  MOP. The  Ministry  of Industry,
the  Ministry  of Finance  and  often  the  very  top  levels  of  Government  play  a
role  in  decisions  about,  for  example,  industrial  policy,  the  allocation  of
foreign  exchange  or the  stance  of the  public  sector  vis-a-vis  layoffs.
Nonetheless,  the  EAC  could  do  more  to influence  the  regulatory
environment  by making  the  costs  of regulation  explicit.  It could  do studies
of the  costs  of social  objectives,  of transporting  goods  from  remote
locations,  of  delays  caused  by overcentralized  decision  making,  etc.  It
could  without  too  much  difficulty  estimate  the  degree  to  which  IPE  output
prices  are  distorted: EAC  has  calculated  the  weights  of different  outputs
and the  IPEs  are  producing  tradeables.  Determining  the  subsidy  element  in
input  prices  may  be more  difficult  but is  also  possible;  again  the  weights
are  known  and  studies  of efficiency  prices  for  some  major  nontradeables
(water  and  electricity)  have  been  done. And it  could  analyze  the  impact  of
policy  changes  on individuals  and  groups  of IPEs. In this  regard  it  is
noteworthy  that  the  EAC  is  developing  a Social  Accounting  Matrix  (SAM)
which  will  show  IPE  performance  and  linkages  with  the  rest  of the  economy
and  is  expected  to  be an input  into  policy  formulation.
B.  Impact  on Decisions  to  Close  or  Sell  IPEs
The  system  calculates  the  operating  efficiency  (or  X-efficiency)
of the  enterprises;  it is  not  designed  to  calculate  allocative  efficiency
(or  whether  the  investment  represents  the  best  alternative  use  of
resources). In  some  cases  the  economic  costs  of  keeping  an enterprise
operating --  even at peak efficiency --  may exceed the economic benefits.-46-
The  IPE  may  be tying  up resources  in  an  activity  with low,  or even
negative,  economic  returns  that  could  be put to  far  more  productive  uses
elsewhere. In some  extreme  cases  where  the  enterprise  has  negative  value
added  at international  prices,  improving  its  operations  may  make  matters
worse;  society  is  worse  off  economically  the  more  the  enterprise  produces
because  the  economic  value  of its  output  is less  than  the  economic  value  of
the  inputs  it consumes. Since  prices  are  distorted  in Pakistan  the
financial  profits  of the  enterprise  do  not  reflect  its  true  benefits  to
society  and  mask the  cost  to the  economy.
In addition,  some  of the  IPEs  appear  to  have outlived  their
original  objective  or are  not  able  to adapt  to the  new  rules  of a  more  open
market. Managers  are in  some  cases  striving  to improve  the  efficiency  of
an outmoded  plant  or one  too  small  or large  scale  to  be efficient. Yet
upgrading  the  enterprise  may  yield  far  lower  returns  than  alternative
investments.
While  this  is  not  a problem  of the  signalling  system  per  se,  it
cannot  be separated  entirely. By focusing  on the  operations  of the  IPEs
and  not  considering  the  fundamental  wisdom  of  keeping  the  enterprise  alive,
the  signalling  system  may  be making  matters  worse  in  some  cases. The issue
also  arises  because  the  EAC  seems  well  placed  to  assess  the  net economic
benefits  of IPEs.  It is  staffed  with  economists  and  the  computer  system  is
set  up to take  shadow  prices. Without  much  additional  data  it could
calculate  the  financial  and  economic  costs  and  benefits  (taking  into
account  indirect  benefits  and  externalities)  of IPEs  that  might  be
candidates  for  closure. The  EAC's  work  on  corporate  planning  and  the  SAM-47-
are  expected  to  be tools  for  assessing  restructuring  requirements  within
the  sector.
V.  SUGGESTIONS  FOR  STRENGTHENING  THE  SYSTEM  IN  PAKISTAN
This review  of the  system  suggests  several  ways  that  the
signalling  system  might  be made  to  work  better  in  Pakistan. First,  the
internal  operations  of the  system  might  be strengthened  by changes  in  the
way the  targets  are  set  and  bonuses  awarded,  in  the  MIS,  and  in the
technology. Second  the  system  would  obviously  function  better  if there
were changes  in the  environnent  of IPEs,  including  in the  autonomy  granted
to  managers,  in the  relationship  with  the  labor  force,  in  the  decisions
about  closures,  pricing  and  competition.
A. ImRroving  the  Internal  Operation  of the  System
Targets  and  Bonuses
First,  priority  should  be given  to shifting  from  private  to
public  profitability  and introducing  further  price  liberalization.  In
particular  the  award  of bonuses  for  profits  achieved  thanks  to  price
controls  or nonoperating  i.come  seems  especially  distortionary.  Price  and
trade  liberalization  have  made  profit  figures  for  many  IPEs  a more
meaningful  reflection  of  efficiency  while  also  increasing  competitive
pressures. While  this  obviates  the  need  to  use  constant  priced  profits  in
many (not  all)  cases,  consideration  should  still  be given  to  making  some-48-
of the  adjustments  to  private  profits  suggested  in the  original  proposal.
Excluding  depreciation  would  eliminate  the  system's  bias in favor  of older
companies  and  the  possibility  that  a manager  may  be rewarded  for  purely
accounting  changes. Non-operating  income  should  be excluded  to avoid
rewarding  managers  for  windfall  gains  that  have  no relation  to operating
efficiency. Even  though  taxes  have  not  been  an important  factor  in IPE
profits,  the  use  of  pretax  profits  avoids  motivating  managers  to reduce  or
evade  taxes  or rewarding  managers  for  a change  in  legislation.  Excluding
interest  charges  assures  that  the  system  does  not  judge  managers  for  a cost
they  cannot  control;  including  the  cost  of  working  capital  judges  them  for
one  they  can. Moreover  this  redefinition  of  profit  following  straight
forward  accounting  practices  should  be easily  grasped  by non-economist,
including  IPE  management,  in  a way  that  constant  priced  profits  might  not.
Several  arguments  can  be raised  against  public  profitability.
One is that  by adding  back  in taxes,  interest  rates  and  depreciation  and  by
subtracting  non-operating  income,  managers  are  not  motivated  to  minimize
their  charges  and  maximize  their  income. While  this  is  an important
argument,  the  fact  is that  most  public  managers  cannot  control  some  items
such  as interest  or age  of plant  and  can  manipulate  others  to  hide
inefficiencies  (for  example,  depreciation  or non-operating  income). Other
indicators  of cash  flow,  liquidity,  debt:equity  or the  like  could  be
introduced  to  assure  financial  solvency  while  keeping  public  profitability
as a closer  proxy  to  efficiency.  All  of these  indicators  are  less  likely
to distort  the  measurement  of  performance  than  private  profits,  and  come
closer  to  measuring  what the  Ministry  of Finance  is  interested  in.-49-
A second  objection  to  public  profits  is  that  using  a different
profit  concept  for  public  firms  makes  it  harder  to  compare  their
performance  with  private  ones,  and  hence  could  impede  rather  than  enhance
competitive  pressures  for improvement.  Yet, rather  than  hindering
comparison,  these  sorts  of adjustments  are  often  essential  to  allow
realistic  public/private  comparisons.  Thus,  pre-tax  profits  should  be used
to take  into  account  the  fact  that  PEs  are  exempt  from  many taxes,  while
when they  do pay  taxes  they  cannot  evade  them  as  easily  as  private  firms.
Similarly,  interest  charges  would  need to  be added  back if  public  firms
have access  to  subsidized  capital  or  pay lower  interest  because  of
government  guarantees. Depreciation  charges  would  also  need to  be added
back to avoid  penalizing  one  firm  or the  other  simply  because  of the  age  of
its  plant  and  to  avoid  problems  with  accounting  anomalies. Finally,
nonoperating  income  is often  the  home of  hidden  subsidies  in PEs  and
subject  to  windfall  gains  that  have  more to  do  with the  PE's  privileged
position  than  its  operational  efficiency.
Finally,  the  EAC  argues  with  some  justice  that  the  introduction
of a new  indicator  could  confuse  management.  On the  other  hand,  the  EAC
has introduced  and  changed  fairly  frequently  the  partial  indicators  used in
addition  to  profits. The  analysis  of this  report  indicates  that  the
benefits  of the  change  may  exceed  the  cost  of some  initial  confusion.
Using  unadjusted  profits  distorted  the  results  and  allowed  inefficient
firms  to  make  passing  grades.
The  EAC  makes  a concerted  effort  to  make  up for  the  deficiencies
of standard  profitability  by  making  adjustments  in the  course  of its-50-
evaluation  and  by developing  partial  physical  indicators.  During  the
evaluation  the  EAC  may  discount  performance  because  of an increase  in
administered  prices  or  a windfall  gain  in  non-operating  income. Despite
the  fact  that  these  represent  realistic  and  objective  adjustments,  managers
have  protested  this  "arbitrary"  discount  and  have  succeeded  in forcing  the
EAC  to award  them  their  grade  on the  basis  of the  original,  unadjusted
indicators.  The  evidence  of the  sample  IPEs  indicates  that  the  EAC  has  had
only  limited  success  in  giving  grades  which  reflect  efficiency
improvements.  A more realistic  indicator  would  avoid  this  problem  and  give
a clearer  signal  to  management.
Furthermore,  partial  indicators  of  physical  efficiency  could  have
unintended  and  perhaps  even  perverse  effects. Using  these  indicators  in
combination  with  profitability  double  counts  certain  items  and  not  others.
In some  cases  this  may  be intentional  (to  count  energy  costs  twice  as a way
to  reinforce  the  need  for  conservation).  But  in  other  cases  the  results
seem  contrary  to the  intention: for  example,  counting  the  volume  of
production  plus  profitability  counts  outputs  twice  and  inputs  only  once  and
thus  deemphasizes  cost  control. EAC  is  aware  of this  problem. When
recently  the  Cell  was instructed  to  give  explicit  targets  for  four  costs
(raw  materials,  energy,  labor,  and financial  expenses)  it  chose  quite
rightly  not  to give  these  an  additional  weight  but to  make  them  constraints
on the  profit  target. This,  however,  raises  a related  problem. Each
additional  indicator  reduces  managements'  degrees  of freedom;  the  virtue  of
profitability  is that  it  weighs  costs  versus  benefits  while  leaving
management  to  judge  how  best to  minimize  costs  and  maximize  benefits.
Systems  which  instruct  managers  how  to  minimize  costs  require  a good  deal-51-
more  information  on the  inner  workings  of the  firm  and risk  reducing
manager's  sense  of responsibility  for  the  other,  unspecified  items.
A second  recommendation  is to  explore  ways  to  begin  to  reward  the
managers  of firms  who  reduce  losses  by improving  efficiency  or who  make
private  losses  and  public  profits. One  possibility  is for  government  to
assume  some  of the  burden  as a payment  for  costs  it  has imposed  on PEs in
cases  where,  for  example,  the  PE  was  undercapitalized.  A first  step  would
be for  the  EAC  to  calculate  what  would  have  been  the  costs  to (i)  reward
bonuses  to loss  making  IPEs  that  would  have  made  profits  under  public
profitability  in  current  prices;  and  (ii)  reward  bonuses  to loss  making
IPEs  that  show  a large  reduction  in  public  losses,  and (iii)  to  reward
bonuses  to loss  making  IPEs  that  would  have  made  profits  under  public
profitability  in  constant  prices. This information  is  already  available
and  the  EAC  has  done  already  a preliminary  estimate. For  simplicity's  sake
this  estimate  could  be done for  all  IPEs  in  these  categories  even through
the  actual  targeting  would  exclude  a share  of these  firms. The  cost  of
giving  a  bonus  to  these  IPEs  is  probably  small  since  the  number  of affected
staff  are  small  and  should  be easily  offset  by the  increment  in  efficiency.
It  was  estimated  that  if Pakistan's  IPEs  achieved  on average  a five  percent
improvement  in  productivity,  only  about  three  percent  of the  increment  in
profits  would  be needed  to  pay  all  IPE  nonunionized  staff  one  month's
bonus. The  MOP is  currently  considering  ways  to  award  bonuses  to such
loss-making  firms.
Third,  bonuses  should  preferably  not  be allocated  across  the
board. While  it  makes  sense  to reward  or  penalize  the  top  management  on
the  basis  of the  enterprise's  performance,  the  rest  of the  staff  should
receive  a  bonus  on the  basis  of their  individual  and  work  unit  performance.-52-
The  size  of the  enterprise's  bonus  pool  should  be linked  to the  IPE's
achievement  of its  target,  but  not the  level  of each  individual  bonus.
There  are  merit  evaluation  systems  in  place  in  some  companies  but  these
might  need  to  be extended  and  improved  to implement  this  recommendation.
Fourth,  consideration  should  be given  to introducing  efficiency
targets  especially  for  those  IPEs  that  face  noncompetitive  markets,  until
competition  can  be introduced.  Managers  of the  competitive  engineering
IPEs  are  very  aware  that  it  is  unfair  to treat  them  the  same  as processing
industries  which  face  a captive  market. The  solution  is  not to ease  the
target  on the  engineering  firms  but  to strengthen  the  target  of the  process
enterprises.  One  way to  do this  is  to  present  the  IPE's  trend  in  constant-
priced  profitability.  Even  if this  constant-priced  profitability  is  not
acceptable  for  bonuses,  it  could  still  be calculated  and  reported  on as an
efficiency  indicator. If  possible  enterprises  should  develop  targets  for
this  indicator  and  their  performance  should  be evaluated  as  a way  of
informing  both  enterprise  and  government  about  the  true  trends  in
efficiency.  IPE  managers  should  be informed  as to  how the  efficiency
indicator  is  calculated  for  their  company  as  a way  of removing  any
misunderstanding  about  public  profitability  in  constant  prices. Even if
this  is  not  acceptable  the  constant  price  profits  could  be used  by the  EAC
as  a check  on its  partial  physical  indicators.
Also,  the  kind  of analyses  done  in this  report  could  be carried
out  for  all  IPEs. Divergencies  between  the  efficiency  indicator  and
current-priced  public  and  private  profitability  could  then  be explained  in
the  EAC  reports  and  begin  a revealing  discussion  of the  distortionary-53-
effects  of price  controls. This  could  contribute  to the  goal  of removing
of  controls  over  prices  wherever  competition  is  possible  and  bringing  the
prices  of tradeables  more  in line  with international  prices.
Fifth,  an  effort  should  be  made to  award  the  bonuses  earlier  in
order  to link  performance  directly  with  reward  and  to increase  the impact
on the  following  year.  One  way to  do this  would  be not to  wait for  the
audited  accounts,  or at least  not to  wait  until  the  accounts  of all
companies  in the  system  are  received,  before  awarding  the  bonuses. When
the  system  was instituted,  waiting  for  the  audited  accounts  was  an
important  way  to  motivate  managers  to  provide  the  accounts  on time. Now
that  accounts  are  being  received  regularly  and  closing  year  accounts  are
similar  to  the  audited  figures,  it should  be possible  to use  year  end
figures. If this is  unacceptable,  the  grade  could  be annouaced  on the
basis  of year  end  figures  but  part  or  all  or the  bonuses  only  awarded  when
the  audited  accounts  are  received.
Improving  Targeting
The EAC  has  rightly  resisted  increasing  its  size to  bring  on  a
lot  of industry  specialists  just  for  target  negotiations.  One  way to
improve  in  depth  knowledge  of the  companies  might  be to  bring  in  outside
experts  from  the  academic  or  business  communities,  as is done  in  Korea. Or
the  EAC  might  rely  more  on the  technical  expertise  in the  corporations.
There  are  some  problems  with these  approaches:  it  could  be  harder  and
slower  to  reach  agreement  with  a lot  of outsiders  involved,  while  the-54-
corporations  have  a vested  interest  in their  enterprises  earning  a good
score. Also the  EAC  has  acquired  skills  in  preparing  and  negotiating
targets  that  would  be lost  if there  were  separate  professionals  involved.
Nevertheless,  the  EAC  could  use  some  specialist  knowledge,  perhaps  provided
by a team  of advisors  brought  in  on a short-term  basis  at EAC  discretion.
Consideration  should  be given  to  expanding  the  EAC  budget  for  this  purpose.
Also  the  EAC  should  develop  international  benchmarks  for  comparison.
Technology  Improvements
The EAC  should  evaluate  the  feasibility  of replacing  the  existing
system  with  one  that  is  more  flexible  and  less  costly. For  example,  a
similar  system  developed  for  Venezuela  uses  microcomputers  and  a commercial
software  package  that  can  be operated  by the  supervising  economists.  In
contrast,  the  present  set  at EAC  uses  a  minicomputer  and  requires  the  EAC
to  maintain  programmers.
B.  CHANGES  IN  THE  ENVIRONMENT  FOR  IPEs
As noted,  environmental  changes  are  an important  aspe^t  of any
productivity  gain.  Since  the  signalling  system  relies  on motivating
managers  to increase  efficiency,  the  system  is  only  as  effective  as the
managers. If  management  is  hemmed  in  by restrictions  or  has  access  to easy
bail outs  in the  form  of government  subsidies  or guaranteed  loans,  the
system  cannot  be effective. Pakistan  introduced  a number  of reforms
parallel  with the  signalling  system  which  played  an important  role in  any-55-
efficiency  impact  it  may  have  had. Ways to  further  increase  the  pressures
for  efficiency  should  be sought. First,  top  priority  should  be given  to
promoting  comRetition  through  further  trade  liberalization,  reducing
barriers  to  private  entry  and  discrimination  against  domestic  private
producers,  and  eliminating  administrated  prices  for  competitive
enterprises. Second,  the  decision-making  process  should  be studied  to  find
ways to increase  flexibility  as  well  as accountability  by removing  the
constraints  mentioned  earlier. Thus,  managers  should  be given  greater
flexibility  to  cut  costs  by laying  off  workers,  closing  uneconomic  lines
and  seeking  least  cost  suppliers.  Layoffs  of redundant  workers  with
severance  pay  and  redeployment  schemes  are  being  successfully  pursued  in  a
number  of developing  cotlntries.  Public  companies  have also  successfully
reduced  redundancies  by vigorously  prosecuting  discipline  charges  and
through  early  retirement  and  voluntary  severance  packages. Similar
measures  might  work in  Pakistan.
In controlling  labor  costs,  managers  will  need  not  only  greater
autonomy  in comgensation  decisions,  but  also  Government  support  for
exercising  wage  restraint. It  makes  no economic  (as  opposed  to  political)
sense  to  negotiate  an across-the-board  bonus  for  the  entire  unionized  labor
force  with  no link  to performance  measures. Obviously,  this  will  be hard
to change,  but  even  linking  a relatively  small  part  of the  bonus  to  a merit
system  would  be an important  signal.
The  Drocurement  rules  should  be examined  for  ways to  streamline
procedures  and increase  flexibility.  Experience  elsewhere  has shown  that  a-56-
vigorous  t 2ost evaluation  and  auditing  systems  is  more efficient  in
controlling  abuses  than  ex  ante  controls  over  procurement.
In  a similar  vein,  the  constraints  on IPE's  choice  of  markets.
products  and  suppliers  should  be studied. In some  cases,  these  are
intimately  linked  to the  IPE's  privileges.  For  example,  an enterprise
might  be required  to serve  certain  markets  as the  price  for  its  protection
against  competition.  Such  arrangements  entail  trade  offs that  are  not
always  readily  apparent. On closer  inspection,  the  net  benefits  are likely
to be less  than  expected,  or  even  negative. Where  the  constraint  is
management's  own  inadequacies  to  react  to  competitive  markets,  the  EAC's
efforts  to  promote  more  flexible  and  innovative  management  should  continue.
The  administration  of credit  is  another  constraint  on public  and
private  efficiency.  As mentioned,  there  is  no reason  why  allocations
should  favor  the  efficient;  most  probably  the  reverse  is true. As Pakistan
removes  distortions  and  increases  the  pressures  for  business  efficiency,
the  need  for  a  more competitive  and flexible  multi-banking  system  will
become  more  and  more  apparent.
Third,  the  Government  should  consider  a hard  look  at  ways to
eliminate  some  of the  social  welfare  objectives  imposed  on the  firms.
Experience  hds  shown  that  PEs  are  a costly  and  often  ineffective  way  to
achieve  those  goals. Furthermore,  it is impossible  to  evaluate  the  costs,
much less  the  success  or failure,  of such  welfare  programs  when they  are
buried  in  the  enterprise's  accounts  instead  of funded  through  the  budget.-57-
For  example,  it  should  be questioned  whether  providing  job  training  by
forcing  a PE to train  five  times  the  people  it  needs  is the  most  effective
way to  accomplish  the  goal  of increasing  productive  employment.  The
enterprise  might  be meeting  this  cost  by deferring  maintenance  or new
product  development,  which  could  be very  costly  for  the  country  in  the  long
run.  Such  training  is  a subsidy  to the  private  sector  which  would
otherwise  have  to  pay for  it,  and  it is  a subsidy  that  is  not  being
periodically  assessed  because  of the  way  it is  being  funded. It  may  be
that  if the  training  were  not  being  done  for  them  the  private  enterprises
would  do it themselves.  Or it  might  be done  more  cheaply  through  a
training  institute. By treating  such  expenses  as  nonroutine  and  weighing
costs  against  benefits  these  issues  can  begin  to  be addressed.
Fourth,  the  EAC  should  do  more studies  assessing  the  impact  of
maior  Rolicy  and  regulatory  decisions  on IPEs. Some  examples  of
potentially  useful  studies  have  already  been  mentioned: the  costs  of
social  objectives,  of locating  IPEs  in  remote  locations,  of delays  caused
by centralized  clearance  procedures  and  of  pricing  policies. In
particular,  the  EAC  could  develop  selected  shadow  distortions.  The  EAC
should  also  consider  reporting  on the  macroeconomic  impact  of IPEs (their
shares  of exports,  imports,  credit,  etc.)  and  study  the  financial  and
economic  viability  of troubled  enterprises.-58-
It  was  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper  to  analyze  the  corporations
in  detail. Interviews  with  corporate,  government  and  enterprise  officials
revealed  a  weak  economic  rationale  for  the  corporations.  In some  cases
they  are  largely  ignored  by their  enterprises,  especially  if the  IPE  is
powerful  as is the  case  with,  for  example,  NRL.  In addition,  the
corporations  have  sometimes  worked  against  competition  among  their
constituent  IPEs.  For  example,  the  cement  companies  have  not  competed
among  themselves  in the  past  but  have  cross-subsidized  inefficient
producers. With  the  recent  emergence  of  private  producers,  the  public
cement  firms  are  acting  as a corporate  body to  be able  to compete  with  the
much  smaller  independent  producers. The  role  of the  corporations  needs  to
be reviewed  in  more  detail. Either  they  should  become  serious  actors  in
the effort to improve IPE performance --  in  which case their own
performance should also be evaluated --  or they should be abolished.
VI.  APPLYING  THE  SYSTEM  IN  OTHER  COUNTRIES
The  Pakistan  signalling  system,  for  all  the  flaws  discussed  here,
represent  a major  advance  in  holding  managers  accountable  for  performance.
In  many  developing  countries,  there  is  no attempt  to develop  targets,  and
no meaningful  reporting  on PE  results;  good  managers  go  unrewarded  and  bad
managers  unsanctioned.  As a result,  the  interest  in  the  Pakistan
signalling  system  is  very  strong  and  a  n.umber  of  countries  are  considering
introducing  something  similar,  including  the  Philippines,  Egypt  and
Venezuela. Korea  already  has a similar  system  in  place. This  assessment
of the  experience  in  Pakistan  provides  a  number  of lessons  for  such
countries  about  the  potential  costs  and  benefits  and  how to  adapt  the
system  to  different  circumstances.-59-
A.  Potential  Costs  and  Benefits
Costs
The  initial  cost  of the  Pakistan  system  was  US$350,000  to
$400,000. This includes  development  costs  and  a  mainframe  computer  system
(with  an operational  memory  of  one  MB and  a fixed  disk  of 620  MB)  with
remote  terminals  and  a tape  unit.  Table  21  of the  Statistical  Appendix
presents  the  organization  chart  of  EAC. Assuming  an average  salary  of
US$300  a month  for  17 top  level  professional  staff,  the  basic  operating
cost  of the  system  is approximately  $70,000  a year,  on $1060  per IPE.
The  financial  cost  of installing  and  operating  the  signalling
system  in  another  country  may  be less  than  the  cost  in Pakistan  for  two
reasons. First,  the  Pakistani  system  was the  first  of its  kind  and  there
is considerable  learning  embodied  in  the  installation  costs. Second,  the
system  can  now  be operated  entirely  on  personal  computers  using  easily
available  commercial  software,  which  obviates  the  need for  computer
personnel  and  reduces  the  equipment  costs. The installation  costs  today
are  more  likely  to  be on the  order  of $75,000  and  the  principal  maintenance
cost  would  be the  salary  of one  analyst  for  approximately  every  ten
companies.-60-
In addition, since there are no economies of scale --  it is just
as  much  work to  evaluate  a small  company  as a large  --  other  countries
might  be able  to  reduce  costs  by focusing  on fewer,  more important
companies. This  was  attempted  in  Pakistan,  but  because  of the  bonus
managers  objected  to  being  excluded.
Several  factors,  however,  could  raise  the  cost  to another
country. First,  the  Pakistan  system  was  designed  to apply  to  companies
under  the  MOP:  70  companies  maximum. Other  countries  may aim  to include
more PEs;  Egypt,  for  example,  is  considering  eventually  extending  a similar
system  to some  200 industrial  public  enterprises.  This  will  raise  the
initial  cost  of data  gathering  and  systemization  and  require  additional
staff  to  operate. Second,  the  Pakistan  system  was  applied  only  to
industrial  public  enterprises.  Although  the  IPEs  are  diverse,  they  include
a  number  of similar  firms  (for  example,  ten  cement  companies,  six
fertilizer  plants,  seven  vehicle  manufacturers)  and  many  are  relatively
simple  processing  industries  with  few  product  lines  (cement,  petroleum
refining,  soda  ash).  Extending  the  system  to the  entire  PE sector  and
including  such  diverse  enterprises  as  utilities,  transport  companies,
agricultural  marketing  boards,  or  banks  will  require  additional  time  and
staff.
Third,  and  most important,  the  data  on IPEs  in Pakistan  were good
before  the  system  began. An effort  to  develop  a uniform  information  system
for  the  enterprises  had  begun  in 1975/76. By the  time  the  system  was
implemented  the  IPEs  had  well  developed  internal  MIS; they  were  already-61-
being  audited  by private  auditors  according  to  generally  accepted
standards;  and  the  EAC  was  systematically  receiving  a lot  of information.
Notwithstanding  this  data  base,  under  the  signalling  system  project  a  good
deal  of time  and  effort  went  into  assuring  that  accounts  were fully
accurate,  comparable  and  received  by the  EAC  in a timely  fashion. Each  IPE
must  prepare  cost  accounting  data  according  to a  uniform  system  (the
required  reports  are  shown  in  Table  17  of the  Statistical  Appendix).
Other  countries  may  need  to  do a lot  more groundwork  to improve
the internal  accounting  and  auditing  and  assure  a timely  flow  of the
necessary  data  to the  monitoring  agency. The  accounting  improvements
required  for  performance  evaluation  are  also  necessary  for  effective
management  and  should  be pursued  in  their  own  right.  Of course  countries
may  also  choose  to  begin  with  a simpler,  less  data  intensive  system  than
that  installed  in Pakistan. This  could  reduce  the  start  up time  for  the
information  system  but it  will  not  obviate  the  need  for  reliable  internal
accounting.  Of course  good  data  are  not  just  a prerequisite  for  good
monitoring. If a PE's  internal  control  and  information  systems  are  not
reliable,  then  it  will  be next  to impossible  for  managers  to improve
performance,  no matter  how  strongly  motivated.
Finally,  Pakistan  boasts  experienced,  skilled  managers  in the
IPEs  and  well  educated  and  competent  economists  in the  EAC.  In recent
years  IPE  managerial  compensation  has  been  competitive  with  the  private
sector  and  the  rate  of turnover  of skilled  staff  has  been  reduced.  The
necessary  skills  are  also  available  in the  three  countries  contemplating-62-
installing  the  system. But  other,  less  developed  countries  will  need to
budget  more for  training  and technical  assistance.  A notable  feature  of
the  Pakistani  system  is  the  fact  that  the  EAC  staff  are  not  part  of the
civil  service  and  their  salaries  are  paid  by a levy  on the  IPEs. This  has
been important  in  enabling  the  Cell  to attract  the  necessary  skills  and
could  be usefully  tried  in  other  countries.
Benefits
The  most important  potential  benefits  from  the  system  are:
improvement  in the  operating  efficiency  of the  enterprises  and improvement
in the  general  contribution  of the  sector  to the  economy. How  realizable
are  these  benefits? Not  surprisingly,  this  report  has  not  been  able  to
provide  a definitive  answer  to that  important  question. Judging  from  the
short  experience  in Pakistan,  an improvement  in  operating  efficiency  may
result;  especially  if the  performance  evaluation  system  is  combined  with
other  reforms.
The  Pakistani  system  has so far  not  been  utilized  to  promote  the
sort  of reforms  that  would  make  a  broader  contribution  to  macroeconomic
efficiency  (which  could  entail  pricing  changes,  liquidations,  deregulation,
etc.),  so the  premise  that  the  system  could  contribute  to development  in
this  way is  not  proven  by this  case. Nevertheless,  the  system  develops  all
the  necessary  information  and  analytical  tools  for  such  use.  There  are
indications  that  it is  beginning  to  be put  to this  use in  Pakistan  and in
the  long  run  this  could  well  prove  its  most  powerful  contribution.-63-
B.  ProsRects  for  Realizing  the  Potential  Benefits
The experience  in Pakistan  offers  some  guidance  on  ways to
impr-  e the  likelihood  that  the  potential  benefits  can  be realized. Among
the  factors  which  influence  the  prospects  for  efficiency  gains  are:
pricing,  market  structure  and  the  coverage  of the  system;  the  supervisory
structure  for  PEs  and  the  degree  of  managerial  autonomy;  and  the  role  of
the  labor  force.
Pricing  and  Market  Structure  and  its  Implications  for  Coverage  of the
System
There  is  ample  evidence  that  competition  is  an important  force  in
promoting  efficiency  in  any  enterprise,  public  or  private.  There  are  many
reasons  why  competition  may  not  exist  in a  developing  country;  absence  of
competition  is  often  a reason  for  creating  public  enterprises.  But  in
Pakistan  there  are  instances  where  the  opportunities  for  competition  have
not  been fully  explored  (among  public  fertilizer  or cement  plants,  for
example).
The  signalling  system  is  in  a sense  a  market  proxy;  it  creates
pressures  for  efficiency  that  in  other  circumstances  might  be supplied  by
the  market. Of course  markets  can  have  many  failings,  but  bureaucracies
may  do even  worse. And  these  administrative  arrangements  prove  a weak
substitute  for  competitive  pressures. Moreover,  it is the  existence  of
monopolies  and  price  distortions  that  complicate  the  system  most and  make
it  difficult  to administer.-64-
For  all these  reasons  governments  will  want to  consider  using
competitive  pressures  to  promote  efficiency  wherever  possible  through  trade
liberalization,  removal  of  barriers  to  private  entry  and  discrimination
between  public  and  private  enterprise,  promotion  of  exports,  etc.  In
particular  import  liberalization  is  an important  way to increase
competition  in large  scale  industries  where  public  enterprises  tend  to
dominate  the  domestic  market. This  will  greatly  simplify  the  task  of
evaluating  competitive  PEs,  which  can  be held to  a simple  profit  target  at
current  prices,  and  can  allow  the  system  to focus  more  on natural
monopolies  such  as  utilities  and  railways. 1 The  latter  are  usually  the
most important  in  terms  of the  budget  and  the  rest  of the  economy;
certainly  in  Pakistan  the  inefficiencies  of the  power  authority  have  had
far  more damaging  effects  on economic  growth  than  that  of any  IPE.
One  consequence  of freeing  market  forces  is  that  some  PEs  will
not  be able  to  compete. In  some  cases  this  may  be corrected  by changing
management  and  giving  managers  the  authority  to  cut  costs  and  seek  new
markets  or  by restructuring  the  finances  and  operations  of the  company.
But in  other  cases  the  company  may  be the  wrong  size  or  producing  the  wrong
1/  Of course  competition  will  still  be imperfect  and  a case  could  be made
for  using  constant  prices  even  for  fully  competitive  enterprises. (For
example,  should  a manager  of an oil  company  have  been  rewarded  for
windfall  profits  in  the  early  1980s?) But  in terms  of  priorities.
adjusting  the  prices  of  noncompetitive  firms  is the  more  important.-65-
product  for  present  markets. And,  as mentioned  above,  improving  operating
efficiency  is  not  enough  to insure  a net  efficiency  gain. An important
contribution  to  the  overall  efficiency  of the  sector  is to ]iquidate
nonviable  companies. This  also  greatly  simplifies  the  task  of monitoring
and  evaluation.
Supervision  of the  Sector  and  Managerial  Autonomy
If governments  choose  to focus  the  system  more  on noncompetitive
PEs,  then  it  might  make  sense  to  have  a central  performance  evaluation
system. For  one  thing,  noncompetitive  PEs  are  found  along  with competitive
ones  under  the  same  ministries.  For  another,  many  governments  lack  the
skills  or funds  to create  evaluation  units  in  every  oversight  ministry.
Furthermore,  the  Ministry  of Production  in  Pakistan  is  not  a typical
ministry  in  Pakistan  or in  other  countries. Its  role  is  to supervise  the
IPEs  under  it;  a separate  Ministry  of Industry  is  responsible  for
formulating  industrial  policy. The typical  sector  ministry  combines  these
roles  and  often  does  an inadequate  job  of supervision.  Sector  ministries
tend  to see  themselves  more  as advocates  of PEs  th&n  as their  evaluators.
Finally,  having  a central  evaluation  unit  would  help  resolve  some  of the
problems  the  EAC  has  in  assuming  a  wider  role  when  that  role  brings  it into
issues  that  are the  domain  of other  ministries.  Thus  a central  unit  might
be better  placed  to influence  the  Ministry  of Finance  to grant  competitive
PEs  greater  autonomy. A central  unit  could  have  a  broader  view  of trends
in the  public  enterprise  sector. The  Korean  experience  would  be worth
studying  in  this  regard  since  it  covers  PEs  from  all  sectors  and  is
centrally  administered.-66-
A central  unit  would  not  necessarily  manage  the  evaluation  system
alone;  it  could  draw  on  expertise  of the  sector  ministries  to  do the
evaluation. In  some  large  countries  it  might  be appropriate  for  the
central  unit to  delegate  most  of the  operation  of the  system  to the  sector
ministries  or to  holding  companies  if they  exist,  and  to focus  on
aggregating  information,  doing  comparisons,  maintaining  the  system,
assuring  the  quality  of the  evaluations  and  conducting  periodic  checks,
designing  improvements,  and  doing  macroanalyses.  Smaller,  resource  scarce
countries  are  unlikely  to  have  sufficient  qualified  personnel  to staff  more
than  one  or two  supervisory  units.
An important  feature  of the  Pakistani  system  is  the  fact  that  the
performance  evaluation  system  was  not  introduced  in isolation.  The
"hardening"  of the  managerial  environment  was an important  influence  on the
efficiency  gains. This implies  that  the  system  should  be combined  with  a
sharp  cutback  in  access  to funds  for  investment  (at  least  at the  outset),
reductions  in subsidies  and  easy  access  to  credit,  decentralization  of
authority  for  personnel  decisions  and  other  cost  cutting  measures,  and  most
importantly,  a demonstrated  readiness  to fire  managers  who  do  not  perform.
Strong  commitment  on the  part  of top  decision  makers  was  an important  part
of the  Pakistani  (and  Korean)  reforms  and  is  a  prerequisite  for  getting  the
system  off  the  ground. The  Pakistani  experience  also  shows  that  the  impact
of the  system  will  be constrained  by the  managers'  degrees  of freedom.
Autonomy  will  need to increase  parallel  with  accountability  for  the
exercise  to  be meaningful.-67-
Role  of the  Labor  Force
A critical  factor  in  the  operation  of the  system  in Pakistan  is
the  IPE's  inability  to lay  off  workers  or effectively  keep  wage increases
in line  with productivity  improvements.  The IPEs,  as public  enterprises
everywhere,  are  not  a  major  source  of  employment  since  they  tend  to  be in
capital  intensive  activities.  The  cost  to the  economy  is  not  just the  cost
of inflated  wages  or redundant  workers;  the  wage  bill in  such  capital
intensive  activities  tends  to  be a relatively  small  part  of their  costs.
More  important  is the  cost  of keeping  inefficient  PEs  or unproductive
product  lines  working  to  provide  employment,  and  the  inefficiencies  and
demoralization  that  bring  down  productivity  in  an  overstaffed  enterprise.
Programs  to  raise  public  and  worker  understanding  of the  need  for  reform,
including  in some  cases  plant  closures  and  layoffs,  combined  with
redeployment  and  severance  pay  arrangements  will  make it  easier  to
implement  a  meaningful  performance  evaluation  system.
C.  Adapting  the  System  to  Other  Circumstances
Simpler  Systems
The  design  of the  Signalling  System  is  based  on some  basic  and
sensible  principles. 2 One  of these  is that  targets  should  be few,
2/  See  Leroy  Jone,  "Performance  Evaluation  for  Public  Enterprises",
Boston,  June 1985.-68-
comprehensible,  and  weighted. The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  targets  are
meant  to signal  managers  as to  what  government  considers  desirable  behavior
and  to allow  government  to  control  enterprises  on the  basis  of results,  not
their  conformity  to  bureaucratic  processes. The targets  should  therefore
aim  to give  a clear  indication  of  government's  objectives  and  priorities,
but  not second  guess  management  on  how  to reach  these  goals. For  example,
setting  targets  for  profits  and  for  working  capital,  inventory  levels,  and
the  like,  tells  managers  not  only  what  to achieve  but  how to  achieve  it.
It  becomes  impossible  to then  hold  management  responsible  for  success  or
failure. A second  principle  of the  system  is to  use indicators  that  count
all  costs  and  all  benefits  once  and  only  once. This  avoids  double  counting
and  asymmetric  counting. Profits  have  the  advantage  of  being  a weighted
indicator  of benefits  minus  costs  that  meet  these  principles.
But in  couttries  where  financial  data  are  unreliable,  where
profits  would  need  to  be calculated  in constant  or shadow  prices  to  be
meaningful,  and  where  skills  are  scarce,  some  simple  engineering  indicators
coupled  with  cost  per  unit  of output  targets  may  be a  starting  point.
These  indicators  do tend  to distort  managerial  behavior  by focusing  on only
one  aspect  of  performance  (for  example,  by counting  costs  and  not  revenues
you  may  encourage  managers  to forego  expenditures  with  high returns). But
the  Pakistan  case  provides  some  evidence  that  efficiency  could  be improved
with  a far  simpler  system. If,  as  hypothesized,  IPE  managers  responded  to
an imperfect  target  (private  profits)  with  efficiency  gains  because  they
had (or  thought  they  had)  no other  way  to achieve  the  bonus,  then  other
imperfect  indicators  (such  as cost  per  unit  of  output)  might  have the  same
effect --  at least in the initial  years.-69-
Another  way  to simplify  the  system  and  still  give  correct  signals
to  managers  is to  shadow  price  a only  a few  critical  items,  for  example,
electricity,  wages,  foreign  exchange. This  simplifies  the  calculation  and
makes  it easier  to  pinpoint  and  estimate  the  costs  of price  distortions  and
to identify  economically  nonviable  enterprises.  It also  gives  managers
greater  incentive  to react  to fluctuations  in  world  market  prices.
Finally,  the  system  could  focus  on fewer  PEs. The largest
enterprises  causing  the  biggest  fiscal  drain  or  with the  most linkages  with
the  rest  of the  economy  would  be the  logical  place  to  begin.  In  most
countries  no more  than  10 to 15  enterprises  need  be covered. But
Pakistan's  experience  shows  that  it  may  prove  hard  to restrict  the  system
to  a few  PEs,  especially  if  bonuses  are  given.
The  Incentive  System
Other  countries  may  wish to  give  more  emphasis  to  the  public
recognition  of top  performers  than  Pakistan  has.  Depending  on the  cultural
context,  the  public  announcement  of grades  and  the  award  of medals  or other
non-material  honors  can  be more important  to top  management  than  the  bonus.
Discussions  of the  achievement  of the  targets  in  meetings  with  permanent
secretaries,  ministers  and  (as  in  Korea)  the  head  of state  has proven  very
effective  in  motivating  managers.-70-
Amount  of Macroeconomic  Information  Generated  by the  System
Besides  performance  evaluation,  government  needs  information  on
its  PEs in  order  to  develop  informed  macroeconomic  policies If the  system
is  centralized  and its  scope  is  broader,  then  it  would  be easy  to  use it
for  broader  policy  purposes. The  Pakistani  system  provides  information  on
PE  production,  value  added  and  investment  in  current  and  constant  prices;
it generates  all  standard  financial  ratios  and  debt information;  it  gives
volume  of production  and  sales,  number  of employees,  energy  consumption,
labor  productivity,  and  the  like;  and  it  provides  detailed  price  indices
for  items  of public  production  and  consumption.  Since  all  of this
information  is  computerized  and  standardized,  it can  be easily  aggregated
to  provide  a complete  picture  of the  trends  in  a  major  sector  of the
economy  for  planning  and  decision  making  purposes.- 71  -
AnnexA
EXPLANATION  OF TME DIVISA  INDEX USED IN  THE SIGNALLING  SYSTEM
The  best  way to explain  the  divisa  index  is to  use a simple
example  of an IPE  with two  inputs,  say  coal  and  oil.  Let  us assume  that
the  price  and  quantity  zonsumed  evolve  as follows:
YEAR  ONE  TOEALTWQ  YEAR  THREE
P  Q  V  P  Q  V  P  Q  V
COAL  1  10  10  2  11  22  2  13  26
OIL  2  3  6  2  2  4  3  2  6
16  26  32
P-price,  Q-quantity,  V-value.
Ignoring  year three  for  the  moment,  we can  determine  the trend  in the
volune  of input  consumption  with two  comon  indices,  Laspoyres  end Paasche,
and  witb the  divisa  index. Using  the  Laspeyros  index  the  base  year data
provides  the  weights. Thus,  if  we construct  a Laspeyres  price  index  using
year one  as the  base year,  we are  treating  oil (P  - 2) as twice  as
important  as  coal  (P  - 1) and  putting  a premium  on decreasing  the
consumption  of oil.  Applying  base year  prices  to year two  would  give  a
value  in constant  prices  of 15 (1  x 11  +  2  x 2).  showing  that  the  quantity
of inputs  consumed  decreased  by 6%.
With the  Paasche  index  the  last  year  data  provide  the  weights. If
year two is  the  last  year,  than  we are treating  coal  and  oil as equally
important  since  they  have the  same  price (P  - 2).  And  we show the  same
value in  year one  as in  year two  in constant  prices  (year  two  price  times
year  one quantities  of coal and  oil. i.e.,  2  x 10 +  2 x 3  - 26),  showing
that  the  overall  quantity  consumed  remained  the  same in  years  one  and two.
A divisa  price  index  uses two  year average  values  as weights. The
weight is  thus  he value  of each item  in  year one  plus its  value in  year
two  divided  by two.  In the  example,  this  would  yield:
(V  +  Vt,l)/2  - W
Coal:  (18  +  22  )/2  - 16
Oil:  (  6  +  4  )/2  - S
Coal  in  this  case  is  throo  times  as important  as  oil.  Applying  this
weighted  average  of  values  to  the  quantities  yields:
YEAR ONE  YEAR TWO
Coal:  10  x 16  - 160  11  x 16  - 176
Oil:  3 x  :  - 15  2  :  5  - 1j
175  186
showing  that  overall  quantity  increased  by 6%72-
If  we  now  add  year  three  the  difference  between  the  three  indices  is
even  clearer.  The  Laspeyres  index  uses  the  same  base  year  prices  for
weights,  year  one. The  Paasche  base  year  changes  to  year  three  and  we  mus;
redo  our  calculations  of  the  prevlous  years.  Tho  dlvisa  index  uses  a
weighted  average  of  the  last  two  years  and  is  thus  constantly  changing.
The  picture  with  divisa  is  now:
Coal  - (22  +  26)/2  - 24  and  Oil  - (4  + 6)/  2  - 5
YEAR  TWO  YEAR  THREE
Coal:  11  x 24  - 262  13  x  24  - 312
Ol:  2  x  5 - 12  2  x  5  - J0
272  322
showing  that  the  volume  of  consumptLon  increased  by  18%.  The LAspeyres
index  glves  an  increase  of  about  6% and  the  Paasche,  14%.
The  advantage  of  tho  Laspeyres  ls  clearly  its  simpliclty,  but  this
must  bo  welghed  against  lts  dLsadvantage--Lts  failure  to  take  account  of
changes  in  relative  prices.  The P-asche  index  corrects  for  thls,  but  its
requires  that  the  series  be  recalculated  with  each  now  end  of  period  and  it
tends  to  overstate  the  importance  of  price  changes.  The  divisa  is
compIicated,  but  not  as  burdensome  as  Paasche,  and  by  using  values  as
weights  it  takes  account  of  shifts  in  quantities  which  mitigate  the  effect
of  changes  in  prices.- 73 -
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Table 3:  Pakiatan:  (PEs  Under  NWP;  Profits  After  Taen  and
Grade  Achieved
(Mill§ion of  Rupe)
1902/83  1983/84  1984/85  I  1985/85 ......  .........  ......  .........  ---.......--  ........................... 
Profit  Profit  YVer  in  Profit  Year  in  -Proftit  rer  in ICoRPOtAT  ON  u N1  I  t  S  After  Tax Aft.Ts  Inc.3"t.  Gradada)  Aft.Ts  Inc.SySt. Grade(aO  Aft.T*cb)lnc.Syst.  Grade(e)
IfCCCL  Antiblotic  (M)  1.18  4.66  *  C  0.58  *  a  *2.85  *  I Ittehad  Chficals  C')  38.36  20.53  *  C  20.28  *  E  3.75  E  | Ittehad  Pesticide  -0.04  2.43  0.06  *  a Kurron  Chlmicals  -1.59  0.29  0.02  *  I
National fIbrez  59.36  5.06  0  -37.66  *  a  n.a. Nosihera  cOt  -0.41  *3.43  1.99  *  C  *1.15  *  I Pakt  "  )  0.09  0.39  *  C  0.89  *  C  0.73  *  c Pakistan  PVC  0.58  0.02  *  I  *5.10  *  E Ravi  Enginerfln  ()  0.06  1.00  A  1.26  *  E  1.57  *  p v  RaZyon  M  19.5  25.6rA  7.7  **  0  8.58  *  A Slnid  Alktlic  M-  0.21  -5.56  *  E  0.03a  4.4  A  *  * St  CraM6cs ()  *1.t  1.55  -3.25  *  e  11.56 Suat Elutriation  M  1.10  0.53  C  0.57  *  C0.21 Nowhere  PVC  2.43  3.n3  *  A IT  0 T A L  1.81  53.02  -2.18
INFC  Lyallpur  Chwicats  (t  7  1.38  0.94  *  C  2.01  A  A  3.34  *  A Iattalt  Marketing  0.00  0.00  0.00  *  C  0.00  *  A Pek Amricanf  ()  21.08  5.34  *  a  40.29  *  a  10.63  A Pak Arab ()  -211.  95.32  *  C  111.61  *  A  168.42  *  t Pak China()  100.37  21.8  *  E  8.4  *  0  18.62  *  A I  Pak  Saudi ()  202.49  142.  n  A  127.41  *  A  10.73  *  C ;T 0 T A L  113.64  246.19  289.76  306.74
PAW  Al-Ghazi  17.18  12.71
Awei  Autos  18.39  7.11  A  A  2.63
Ueluchistan  Heels  -13.67  -21.94
Blel  Engineering  (")  19.04  8.31  *  C  14.57  *  0  I  1.46  *  C Domstic  AWp  laces  (M)  -. 64  -5.46  a  -2.26  *  e  |  -7.30  * Mack  Trucks  3.76  4.27  4.11  a  A  I  -4.07  0  na.. Millat  tractors  38.87  45.29  *  A  40.48  *  * National  Notors  29.96  23.05  27.84  *  A  *  f.. Nayedgur  -20.50  0.10  *  -4.19  *  E
Trwctors  DeOvlop.  61.16  39.00  0.16
Pak Suzki  21.64  83.25  A  65.62  A  A Reilic  motors  -4.63  13.14  0  27.79  A  A Slnd Engineering  17.03  7.54  10.15  I  10.32  0  C Traitors  Ovtlqmnt  -3.83  -6.99  4.8  *8 t  0  q  A L  156.61  160.51  190.51
SCCP  Aocfated  C_mt(*)  6.44  8.20  0  O  46.29  *  P  37.50  A  A Oandot (w)  4.06  8.95  0  E  13.00  0  0  21.97  E  E nral  Refract.  -4.50  2.86  2.7  *  E  3.53  *  E haribmal ()  9.70  10.26  A  120.73  *  63.46  A  J  nv  d  -n  9.9f  13.9J  0  52.5rJ  a  $  9.39  *  C  I KIaht  3.00  -49.10  *  a  -15.00  *  0 Maple  Laf  ()  3.10  2.71  c  54.99  *  A  12.19  *  A bmthmb (a)  9.22  21.34  a  99.48  *  52.62  0  C Natioml  Cemnt ()  6.03  0.64  *  0  10.11  *  R  21.06  * Thatto  (*)  5.17  8 00  0  -2.39  *  E  -23.72  * Whfte  o  1.05  0.00  *  a  7.85  0  a  6.93  A Zol  Pak ()  T."0  16.80  0  71.80  *  A  17.30  *  c t  O t A  58.16  96.74  407.  257.23
aIMC:  SAC  Alnma Reports
a) lmd  an ad|iated  currant  profits  after  taxn  an  reviewed  grads
bl  Data  from  Wdited  adjusted currant  pro Ito.
c)  lntitA  gradea  based  on wuiited  adjusted  wrrnt  profits  after  tax.- 77  -
Tebte  3 cant:  Pakistan:  IPEc  Under  NO;  Profits  After  Toxoa
wnd  Gradet Achieved
(itltions  of  ftR  s)
I  I  I  19UA  I  1983/84  19/85  I  t195/6
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  . . . . ...........................  ...........................
P  trofit  Profit  Veer  In  Profit  Year  In  Profit  Year  in
ICCOP00ATIM  U N I  VT  $  Aftr  Ta  Aft.Ts  InM.Syat.  Crade(e)  Aft.Ts  Inc.Sn  t.  GroeCa)IAft.Tsaflnc  .Sns.  :racc(::
I#C  _  NP  *-6.71  -9.13  .5.42  O  0.03  *
I  I^C  1-l  0.00  O."  *  1  16.73  O  I  £
I  Kaureg  i  Pipe)  7.29  3.50  *  a  -11469  *  a  I  2.4  *  a
I  Metrooita  Steast  (e)  5.21  4.25  *  a  11.09  *  A  12.55  *
I  lNorthern  Founid.  -2.26  0.00  I
I  IPMt  (0)  1.01  -4.n  . a  3.74  *  t I  6.32  *  ;
I  IPIC(o  )  28.61  6.39  *  a  5.56  *  c  I  -39.60  *  I
I  Pak Swit4her  0.43  0.22  0.6  *  U  *2.37  *  t
I  Plier  steak  1.52  -1.17  *  C  .0.99  *  U  . n.o.
I  Oulity  ste  1.51  2.47  *  S  3.51  *  M  1.15  . -
itO  AL  36.91  -1.54  26.22
IPIOC  AI-Lib  -4.20  -4.47
Wm Suar  -29.19  -19.36  0.00
Cotton  Giming  -3.63  0.06  0.25
Dir.  Forest  .43.42  *62.05  I
I  *  *Nwri  Woollen  .17.69  24.92  *D2.08 
I  Irn  . teet  Pip  2.77  1.70  3.55  *  1.1
LwkU  &r  29.9  *26.08  -25.10  lt1.25  * 
owid_  C*)  1.21  1.0  -6  *.52  *  2.17 
gW_sot  -78.93  -67.84
Twta  .- 26.34  -30.99
I  IrIn  61  Co.  0.00
I  Karaci  as  Co.  0.00
IT  0  t  A L  -73.03  -23.3  -216.4
PURA1  lUAU  0.57  0.31  1.06
Notiami  Petrocarban  ~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.76  0.57  0.73
NI  l  3t6r  46.00  *  A  120.00  *  A  .
IT 0 t  A L  45.02  4.95  121.83
ITtC  Textile  winding  -2.51  -2.01  0.10  *  2
I  Textite Spiming  -13."  -10.31  -13.80  *  I
1T  O  T A L  *16.10  -12.42  .13.70 
;lls  SA  Annal  Reprts
a)  _am an  edjusted  eurrent  proits  after  tr  end on  riewed  grads.
b)  Date  frte  wtditod  adjusted  oWrait  prof  ita.
c)  Initial  grades  hO d  on  H  oAdited  adjusted  wrent  protits  aftte  tax.TABLE  4
SIND  ALKALIS
PROFITABILITY
(Millions  of  Rupees)
..............................  .........................................................................  ...  ........  .............  .................
1980/81  1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85
................................  .......................................................................  .....  ........  ..  . ....  ......  ...............  ................................  .....  .........  .
1.  Profit  at  Current Prices
.........................
Private  profit  after  taxes  5.07  6.83  0.21  -5.25  0.03
Private  profit  before  taxes  10.57  6.83  0.21  -5.25  0.03
Public  profit  at m*rket  prices  13.60  13.71  3.94  -1.83  20.39
2.  Profit  at  constant  1981/1982  prices
...................................
Public  profit  at  mrket  prices  13.55  13.71  4.79  10.76  34.27
3.  Assets
Total  assets at Curr.  Acw.  values  137.23  173.39  197.38  213.91  225.34
Net Worth at  Curr.  Acct.  values  48.35  50.06  50.28  44.72  44.75
C pital  EUp.  at Curr.  Acct.  values  101.69  115.45  105.97  108.18  101.16
Fixed  Op. Assets  at Curr.  Acet.  values  49.33  74.64  69.47  65.48  139.56
Fixed Op. Assets at Curr.  Market values  314.77  362.05  398.81  425.40  537.69
Fixed Op.  Assets  at Comstant  mrket  values  328.39  362.05  364.40  366.64  439.27
4. Profitabitity  ^
.............  OD
Private:  After  tax;  on total  assets  3.69  3.94  0.11  -2.45  0.01
Private:  After  tax;  on net  worth  10.48  13.65  0.42  -11.73  0.07
Private:  Before  tax;  on  cap.  exp.  10.39  5.92  0.20  -4.85  0.03
Public:  At curr.  kt.Ps on fix.op.  assets  4.32  3.79  0.99  -0.43  3.79
Public:  At  cons. ekt.Ps on fix.op.  assets  4.13  3.79  1.31  2.93  7.80
tX~~~~uauuUC=gaauua~  3  DC#Uzm=--  =E  *  ss====3=-s====333U  ==================.TABLE  S
RAVI  RAYON
PROFITABILITY
(Millions  of  Rupees)
1980/81  191/82  1962/83  1983/84  1964/as
1.  Profit  at  Current  Prices
.....................
Private  profit  after  taxes  13.07  14.25  19.35  25.67  7.72
Private  profit  before  taxes  13.07  14.25  20.20  25.82  16.72
Public  profit  at  warket  prices  30.40  34.38  33.06  39.51  28.01
2.  Profit  at  constant  1981/1982  prices
-.-..  6s  ^*v...............  .................  -
Public  profit  at  _rket  prices  32.47  34.38  26.77  44.57  25.29
3.  Assets
Tota:  assets at  Curr.  Aect.  values  311.83  331.24  309.90  307.81  317.7s
Net  Worth  at  Curr.  Acet.  values  60.60  83.73  117.26  117.00  118.90
Cqpital  Exp.  at  Curr.  Acct.  values  193.73  2z3.50  269.39  256.71  245.85
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Curr.  Acct.  values  76.29  93.14  87.52  123.55  117.84
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Curr.  Market  values  1040.60  1113.30  1221.38  1344.81  1423.32
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Constant  mrket values  1086.74  1113.30  1116.78  1159.69  1165.46
4.  Profitability
Private:  After  tax;  on  total  assets  4.19  4.30  6.24  8.34  2.43
Private:  After  tax;  on  net  worth  21.56  17.02  16.50  21.94  6.49
Private:  Before  tax;  on  cap.  exp.  6.74  6.37  7.50  10.06  6.80
Public:  At curr.  mkt.Ps  on  fix.op.  assets  2.92  3.09  2.71  2.94  1.97
Public:  At cons. kt.Ps  on  fix.op.  assets  2.99  3.09  2.40  3.84  2.17
U--=  =  "  =  #  S  BUZUE3UUUUUUUUUUUUUUEU33U33  UU3UUUUI  BUUUUUUUU  EUSUUEUZUUUIUUUUZUSU  33S-  3*33U332 TABLE  6
PAK SAUDI  FERTILIZER
PROFITASILITY
(Iitlions  of Rupees)
1980/81  1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85
............ I.................................  ...............................................................  ...............
1.  Profit  at  Current  Prices
.........................
Private  profit  bfter  taxes  100.78  240.16  202.49  142.36  127.41
Private  profit  before  taxes  100.78  240.16  202.49  190.66  197.41
Putic profit  at  mrket prices  348.42  502.48  445.18  394.43  453.21
2.  Profit  at  constant  1981/1962  prices
Public  profit  at mrket prices  255.57  502.48  320.44  298.70  430.67
3. Assets
Total  asets at  Curr.  Acet.  values  2099.59  2276.94  2444.65  2102.60  1950.60
Net Worth  at  Curr.  Aect.  values  655.45  802.63  892.96  951.13  904.04
Capital  Exp.  at Ctrr.  Acct.  values  1650.41  1852.61  1838.26  1726.96  1527.28
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Curr.  Acct.  values  1677.37  1680.27  1552.48  1396.71  1262.73
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at Curr.  Market  values  3684.03  4011.10  4492.21  4831.65  5205.59
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Constant  mrket  values  3833.94  4011.10  4094.43  4153.43  4241.32
4. Profitability  cn
Private:  After  tax;  on  total  assets  4.80  10.55  8.28  6.77  6.53
Private:  After  tax;  on not worth  15.38  29.92  22.68  14.97  14.09
Private:  Before  tax;  on  cap.  exp.  6.11  12.96  11.02  11.04  12.93
Public:  At curr.  *kt.  prices  an fix.  op.  assets  9.46  12.53  9.91  8.16  8.71
Pubilc:  At cons.  *kt.  prices  on fix.  op.  assets  6.67  12.53  7.83  7.19  10.15
U  =.UU=  =-U.UU._UCU.:Z=UU8=ZUU  3=38:33  ZinU=C=CC=CC:UU===U=:  C  S====.=  =C-TALBE  7
LYALLPUR  CHEMICAL  AND  FERTILIZER
PROFITABILITY
(Ni'iAons  of Rupees)
1980/81  1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/15
....  ......  ..  ...........  ...............  ...............  ...............  .........  ...........
1. Profit  at  Current  Prices
...........  ........................  ..
Private  profit  after  taxes  2.23  -4.21  1.97  2.18  2.01
Private  profit  before  taxes  4.17  4.73  4.69  5.29  4.95 
Public  profit  at  mrket  prices  19.19  6.65  3.29  5.43  6.10
2. Profit  at constant  1981/1982  prices
...................................
Public  profit  at  mrket prices  3.61  6.65  13.36  58.86  35.89
3. Assets
Total  assets  at  Curr.  Acct.  values  94.70  92.43  121.36  83.24  87.33
let Worth  at  Curr.  Acet.  values  12.34  17.61  16.99  15.93  17.94
Capital  Exp.  at  Curr.  Acet.  values  17.27  21.50  19.83  18.26  18.84
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Curr.  Acet.  values  13.44  12.57  10.65  8.55  7.78
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Curr.  Narket  values  75.43  82.34  140.06  148.67  155.88
fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Constont  mrket  values  80.64  82.34  130.89  131.00  132.17
4. Profitability  cn
.............
Private:  After  tax;  on  total  assets  2.36  -4.56  1.62  2.62  2.31
Private:  After  tax;  on  rwt  mworth  18.09  -23.91  11.57  13.70  11.t2
Private:  Before  tax;  on cap.  exp.  24.13  22.02  23.65  28.98  26.26
PuklIc:  At  curr.  skt.Pa.on  fix.op.as.ets  25.44  8.08  2.35  3.65  3.91
Public:  At const. kt.Ps.on  fix.op.asaets  4.48  8.08  10.21  44.93  27.15
Source:  EACTABLE  8
JAVEDAI  CEENT
PROFiTABILITY
(Millions  of  Rupees)
. . ............................  ............................................................  ...  ....  .............  ............................  ...........  ...................  ....
1980/81  1981/82  1982/83  1963/84  1984/85  1985/86
1.  Profiti  at  Curret  Prices
Piaeroa.....  .......  ... 1
Private  profit  bfter  taxes  -15.73  3.61  9.96  13.98  16.80  2.5
Private  profit  before  tules  -15.73  3.61  9.96  13.98  16.80  25.54
Pubtic  profit  at mrket  prices  S.99  90.81  89.14  81.45  77.'6  80.67
2.  Profit  at  constant 1981/1982  prices
Public  profit  at  mrket  prices  87.99  90.81  104.40  58.01  57.63  72.13
3. Assets1I
Total  assets at  Curr.  Acct.  values  589.98  608.51  606.49 1  573.27  529.71  552.88 1
net  North at  Curr.  Acet.  values  86.56  88.47  100.13 |  103.11  106.71  130.30
Capital  Exp. at  Curr.  Acct.  values  433.86  456.88  393.34  332.67  351.43  345.25
Fixed Op. Assets at  Curr.  Acct.  values  463.24  458.52  448.06  415.63  394.02  393.19
Fixed 4.  Assets at  Curr. Narket  values  991.50  1090.41  1222.62  1307.13  1386.00  1546.71
Fixed Op. Assets  at  Constant mrket  values  1043.93  1090.41  1125.50  1135.44  1147.54  1147.54 |
4.  Profitability  |  *  - co
.............
Private:  After  tax;  on total  assets  -2.67  0.59  1.64  2.44  3.17  4.62 1
Private:  After  tax;  on net  worth  -18.17  4.08  9.95  13.55  15.75  19.60
Private:  Before tax;  on cap. exp.  -3.62  0.79  2.53  4.20  4.78  7.40 I
Public:  At  curr.  skt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  0.60  8.33  7.29  6.23  5.57  5.22
Pubtic:  At  const.  mkt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  8.43  8.33  9.28  5.11  5.02  6.29
So=  =:=  r3rce=  _::_=EAC__
Source:  EACTABLE  9
GCARIBAL CEIENT: PROFITABILITY
(Millions  of  Rupeos)
.....  .......  ..........  .....................  ................  ...................................  ...........  .......................  ..........
1980/81  1961/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86
.........  .................  ...................  ...............  ...............................................  ....................  . ..  ......  ......  ...............  .......................  ........
1.  Profit  at  Current  Prices
.......  ..........
Private  profit  after  taxes  9.62  13.71  11.46  10.26  8.35  15.61
Private  profit  before  taxes  16.49  27.61  19.98  20.76  23.47  21.71 
PubLic  profit  at  maket  prices  11.86  16.82  13.31  15.59  16.04  10.83
2.  Profit  at  constant  1981/1982  prices
- 51  I
Public  profit  at  m_rket  prices  25.21  16.82  21.56  55.15  53.07  I  34.71
3.  Assets
Total  assets at  Curr.  Acct.  values  194.78  200.97  229.19  254.15  238.  73  289.65 1
Net Worth at  Curr.  Acct.  values  76.50  60.27  66.03  68.33  68. 73  84.28|
Capital  Exp. at  Curr.  Acot.  values  79.68  62.78  67.72  68.76  68.  73  84.28
Fixed Op. Assets at  Curr.  Acct.  values  71.50  59.83  66.02  64.89  70.91  69.68
Fixed Op. Assets  at  Curr.  Narket values  651.32  692.98  768.90  825.73  882.75  981.54
Fixed Op. Assets at  Constant m_rket  values  686.59  692.98  709.53  719.04  74.40  &4.4
4.  Profitability
Private:  After  tax;  on total  assets  4.94  6.82  5.00  4.0.  3.50  5.39  w
Private:  After  tax;  on net  worth  12.58  22.74  17.36  15.02  12.15  18.52
Private:  Before  tax;  on cap. exp.  20.69  43.98  29.50  30.20  34.14  25.76
Public:  At  curr.  mkt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  1.82  2.43  1.73  1.89  1.82  1.10
Public:  At  const.  ekt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  3.67  2.43  3.04  7.67  7.23  4.73
Source: EACTABLE  10
ZEAL PAK
PROFITABILITY
(Millions  of  Rupees)
....................................  ................................................................................  ...............  ............................  ...........
1980/81  19B1/82  1962/83  1983/84  1984/85
1I.  Profit  *t Current  Prices  ---------
........................
Private  profit  after  taxes  12.84  12.88  12.64  15.35  22.61
Private  profit  before  t  xes  22.84  23.13  12.64  19.73  29.61
Public  profit  at  market prices  8.75  13.02  5.53  15.94  25.17
2.  Profit  at  constant 1981/1982  prices
...............  .........................  .
Public  profit  at  _rket  prices  46.62  13.02  -18.30  -167.64  -165.98
3.  Assets
Total  assets at  Curr.  Aect.  values  399.47  350.66  385.77  456.17
Net  Worth  at Curr.  Acct.  values  105.87  111.72  112.36  129.16
Capital  Exp. at  Curr.  Acct.  values  150.93  137.23  121.24  150.30
Fixed Op. Assets at  Curr.  Acct.  values  80.72  92.73  128.61  142.67
Fixed Op. Assets  at  Curr.  Narket  values  1105.61  118t.14  1323.18  1431.86  1492.36
Fixed Op. Assets at Constant mrket  values  1163.95  1187.14  1221.52  1245.19  1238.16
4.  Profitability  oo
Private:  After  tax;  on  total  assets  3.21  3.67  3.28  3.37  n.a.
Private:  After  tax;  on  net  worth  12.12  11.53  11.25  11.89  n.a.
Private:  Before  tax;  on  cap.  exp.  15.13  16.85  10.43  13.13  n.a.
Pubtic:  At curr.  kt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  0.79  1.10  0.42  1.11  1.69
Pub4ic:  At const.  *kt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  4.01  1.10  -1.50  -13.46  -13.41
U  iauuuuuu  3333  zggaa.auU:=,33:3:33.u=:  3S=.3-=aS==US--="=st=-====  Q  ========C===TABLE  11
MILLAT  TRACTORS
PROFITABILITY
(Nitlions  of  Rupees)
...........................  ............................................................  ...................................................
9P60/81  1981/82  19M2/83  1983/aU  1984U85  1985/86
.........................  .....................  ...............  ...............  ........  --------  ---------  ---------
I1.  Profit I  Current  Prices
Private  profit  after  taxes  12.92  24.08  41.19  45.29  40.48  9.53
Private  profit  before  taxes  27.19  45.92  81.49  93.59  77.72  9.95
Public  profit  a:  mrker  prices  9.98  28.46  47.39  54.20  &7.82  -5.47
2.  Profit  at  constant  1981/1982  prices
--  --  I
Public  profit  at  market prices  221.92  28.46  -126.68 |  203.79  -221.87  12.29
3.  Assets
Total  assets at  Curr.  Acct.  values  257.18  405.72  551.52  571.96  570.54  654.76 1
Net Worth at  Curr.  Acct.  values  31.a2  60.74  101.30  139.76 |  181.78  182.89
Capital  Exp. at  Curr.  Acct.  values  31.82  60.74  128.30  172  .88  199.51  189.64
Fixed Op.  Assets  at Curr.  Acct. values  7.38  21.43  24.75  78.98  117.72  123.30
Fixed Op.  Assets  at  Curr.  Market  values  25.09  42.51  51.14  112.19  167.70  202.00
Fixed Op. Assets  at  Constant  market  values  27.09  42.51  48.16  98.88  140.24  |  153.83
4.  Profitability  . cc
Private:  After  tax;  on total  assets  5.02  5.93  7.47  7.92  7.10  I."
Private:  After  tax;  on net  worth  40.59  39.64  40.67  32.41  22.27  5.21
Private:  Before tax;  on cap.  exp.  85.44  75.61  63.52  54.14  38.96  5.25
Public:  At  curr.  kt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  39.80  66.96  92.66  48.31  28.52  -2.71
Public:  At const.  skt.Ps.on  fix.qp.as  eta  819.32  66.96  -263.07  -206.10  -158.20  7.99
_g__zSSIIg===s==a---e=:  =_AC________
Source: EACTABLE  12
HEAVY  MECHANICAL  COGP  TX
PROFITABILITY
(Millions  of  Rupees)
...  ....  . ....  ..  . . . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  . ..  . . . . ..  . . . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1980/81  1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85
...................  ....................  .....  ...  ..  ..........  . ...  ......  .......
1. Profit  at Current  Prices
P..t  p....rofit  after  te-.61682071261
Private  profit  after  taxes  2.66  17.88  28.03  7.12  26.11
Private  profit  before  t  xes  2.66  17.88  28.03  7.:  12  26.11
Public  profit  at  inrket  prices  -45.56  -38.70  -8.62  -91.52  -87.28
2.  Profit  at  constant  1981/1982  prices
Pubtic  profit  at  *rket  prices  -42.91  -38.70  17.97  113.57  0.65
3.  Assets
Total  assets  at  Curr.  AcCt.  valuas  887.39  983.45  1034.30  1143.36  1175.96
Ht Worth  at  Curr.  Acet.  values  132.09  134.27  143.55  151.29  209.46
Capital  Exp. et  Curr.  Acct.  values  459.15  653.04  697.73  676.28  656.18
Fixed Op. Assets at  Curr.  Acet.  values  185.S1V  177.07  177.46  166.39  157.44
Fixed Op.  Assets at Curr.  Market values  034.87  900.24  979.55  1053.19  1098.08
Fixed  Op. Assets at Constant mrket  values  bV2.08  900.24  916.87  921.59  927.09
4. Profit  bitity  co
Private:  After  tax;  on  total  assets  0.30  1.82  2.71  0.62  2.22
Private:  After  tax;  on  net  worth  2.01  13.32  19.52  4.70  12.47
Private:  Bfore  tax;  on  cap.  exp.  0.58  2.74  4.02  1.05  3.98
Public:  At  curr.  skt.Ps.on  fix.op.essets  -5.46  -4.30  -0.8U  -8.69  -7.95
Public:  At  const.  mkt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  -4.71  -4.30  1.96  12.32  0.07
*~=  .uuuuauimuunanuuuuauuazmzz3  =  =22TABLE  13
PAKISTAN  MACNINE  TOOL  FACTORY
PROFITABILITY
(Nillions  of  Rupees)
1980/81  I  1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85
II. Frofit  at Current  Prices
Piaepftatrae..705-02-332.
Private  profit  after  taxes  6.67  10.51  -0.27  -13.37  2.10
Private  profit  before  taxes  6.67  10.51  *0.27  -13.37  2.10
Public  profit  at  mrket  prices  10.05  -0.04  7.90  -41.90  -29.22
2.  Profit  at  constant  1981/1982  prices
Public  profit  at  mrket  prices  24.95  -0.44  210.09  180.94  278.61
3.  Assets
Total  assets at  Curr.  Acct.  values  755.94  726.72  715.56  807.73  860.18
Net Worth at  Cuwr. Acct.  vaLues  291.94  291.84  291.83  291.91  291.88
Capital  Exp. at  Curr.  Acet.  values  430.59  407.44  391.55  408.64  429.35
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Curr.  Acct.  values  312.31  298.67  284.97  276.57  269.20
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Curr.  Narket  values  1105.99  1169.14  1267.35  1351.02  1420.22
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Constant  mrket  values  1167.05  1169.14  1170.72  1176.12  1181.89
4.  Profitability
Private:  After  tax;  on  total  assets  0.88  1.45  -0.04  -1.66  0.24  -
Private:  After  tax;  on ret  worth  2.29  3.60  -0.09  -4.58  0.72
Private:  Before tax;  an cap. exp.  1.55  2.58  -0.07  -3.27  0.49
Public:  At curr.  ekt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  0.91  0.00  0.62  -3.10  -2.06
PuLtic:  At const.  mkt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  2.14  -0.04  17.95  15.38  23.57
I  .UUU33333U3UUU3U3~3233U333Z3UU  1  :UIa=uasas-aazs.azauz-u----------z
Source: EACTABLE  14
PAKISTAN  ENGINEERING  COMPANY
PROFITABILITY
(Millims  of  Rupees)
____.  ___________._.  ........  ................  _........  ................  _.  _.  _.  _  _  _  _..  ...  ..  ._.  .. _.._.  .. _.._.._.  .. _.._..  ._
1980/81  1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85
1.  Profit  at  Current Prices
Private  profit  after  taxis  -4.91  26.78  28.61  6.39  8.58
Private  profit  before  taxes  -4.91  26.78  28.61  9.93  15.48
Public  profit  at  _mrket  prices  -16.35  25.21  24.35  15.22  -2.99
2.  Profit  at  constant  1981/1982 prices
Ptulic  profit  at  *erket  prices  3.19  25.21  110.04  119.07  82.15
3.  Assets
Total  assets  at  Curr.  Acct.  values  604.63  577.37  542.16  554.76  631.99
Met  Worth at  Curr.  Aect.  values  55.65  55.59  80.45  86.09  94.67
Capital  Exp.  at  Curr.  Acet.  values  96.40  86.28  102.07  102.88  140.64
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Curr.  Acct.  values  47.51  70.78  66.10  69.78  67.75
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at Curr.  Market  values  258.83  303.79  331.48  362.87  385.33
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Constant  earket values  272.78  303.79  305.91  315.70  320.00
375.59
4.  Profitability  oD
............. O
Private:  After  tax;  on  total  assets  -0.81  4.64  5.28  1.15  1.36
Private:  After  tax;  on  net  worth  -8.83  48.17  35.56  7.43  9.16
Private:  Before  tax;  on cap.  exp.  -5.10  31.04  28.03  9.65  11.00
Pubtic:  At  curr.  akt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  -6.32  8.30  7.35  4.19  -0.78
Public:  At  const.  kt.Ps.on  flx.op.assets  1.17  8.30  35.97  37.72  25.67
B  auaz  U  UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUIU  UUUUUUUUUEUUSUUUUUUUUUUUUU  IUUUUUUU  BIUUUUUUUUU TABLE  15
NATIONAL  REFINERY
PROFITABILITY
(Millions  of  Rupees)
. ..  ..  ....  ...........  .......  .............  .....  ........  ......  ...  ..  ................  ............
l  19J0/81  ~~~~~~~ ~  ~~~~~1981/82  198/83  198/84  19B4/85
1.  Profit  at Current  Prices
..  ...  . . ...  .....  .
Private  profit  after  taxes  40.13  52.25  43.67  48.00  120.00
Private  profit  before  taxes  40.13  52.25  53.20  114.45  120.00
Public  profit  at m_rket  prices  38.84  15.4"  17.57  94.35  184.83
2. Profit  at constant  1981/1982  prices
Public  profit  at  market  prices  -435.21  15.44  -283.91  686.90  385.31
3.  Assets
Total  assets  at  Curr.  Acct.  vatues  2031.90  2338.99  2570.52  3447.19  3642.26
Net Worth  at  Curr.  Acct.  values  303.4  302.38  298.07  656.52  697.97
Capital  Exp.  at  Curr.  Acct.  values  453.99  619.53  982.35  1744.90  1803.18
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Curr.  Acct.  values  555.77  528.26  487.71  446.30  2355.36
Fixed  Op.  Asseta  at  Curr.  Market  values  899.01  967.28  1050.61  1126.87  3184.55
Fixed  Op.  Assets  at  Constant  market  values  952.96  967.28  974.84  985.41  2642.46
4. Profitability
Private:  After  tax;  on total  assets  1.98  2.23  1.70  1.39  3.29
Private:  After  tax;  on net  worth  13.23  17.28  14.65  7.31  17.19  l
Private:  Before  tax;  on  cap.  exp.  8.84  8.43  5.42  6.56  6.65
Pubtic:  At  curr.  ukt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  4.32  1.60  1.67  8.37  5.80
Public:  At  const.  mkt.Ps.on  fix.op.assets  -45.67  1.60  -29.12  69.71  14.58
.zg  uzu2D==-:  I  3.uu  .==2-==-=a=========3==  D  ===-===5  8~  ==s  ==I-  X=-~3  -~u2  ==-======_=-  - ==-Table  16:  Pakistan:  Coparison  of  Business  Ratios  for  the  Spte  Units
9OT  TO  LlIDUITY  RATIS  OEMEITVRA^TIOS
CA  TIIf  U N I  T  got  %is  Acid-Tet  T,ota  debt  to  met 1eeI  Loe  te  debt  to  aet  worth
1aw1ie2  1waj.  1`13/11  11694/85,  IalZ  19I2/63  I3/04  ab14/41  1401/82  112/4  196I/34  jo4/55  £9l1/l2  12/3  193/04  164/05
FCCX  Si  dAltelis  0.4  0.@  0.27  0.34  0.25  0.2D  0.8I  0.22  1.72  L.O  26.0  2.62  1.31  1.11  1.42  1.25
FCC  Rewl  pages  Lieted  0.27  1. 3  1.43  1.13  0.21  0.91  0.9  0.75  2.61  1.41  1.33  1.29  1.59  1.30  '.20  1.01
C  Leal  Ope em.  A Forti.  0.12  o.  0.74  0.5  0."  0.73  0.62  O.44  2.55  4.7S  2.S6  3.20  0.22  0.17  0.15  I  .05
WPa Soodi Pertil&sa.  1.2  1.3  1.6  I.4  1.23  1.33  1.05  1.43  1.53  1.26  1.62  0.93  1.31  1.06  0.62  0."
SCP  Jjewede  Cemet  0.20  0.20  0.90  0.29  0.10  0.10  0.00  0.00  3.60  3.10  S.10  2.C0  2.2D  2.20  2.30  1.60
SCCP  Zest  Fab  Cmeet  Lt.  0.45  0.4S  0.51  N.A.  0.21  0.25  0.3S  N.A.  0.43  0.63  1.01  N.A.  0.25  0.03  0  t  N.A.
1CCP  *ber*,.ae  Cemt  1Ltd.  0.40  0.60  0.40  0.40  0.90  0.30  0.30  0.40  0.40  0.60  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
INeway  Necheeeal  Cowles  1.25  1.16  1.24  1.30  1.15  1.56  1.16  1.19  4.64  4.67  5.27  3.45  3.1  3.66  3.47  2.13
SW  P  ;-eiete  umgeing  Co.  0.21  0.17  0.22  0.50  0.16  0.11  0.16  0.42  7.34  4.12  4.25  4.31  0.55  0.27  0.20  0.49
#IC  ;-ti.t  1Nebime Tool  0.46  0.27  0.25  0.29  0.43  0.26  0.22  0.23  0.70  0.67  0."  1.0  0.40  0.34  0(.  0.47
PAW  Hillt  Ie Trtrem  0.70  0.S0  0.40  0.30  0.60  0.70  0.40  0.10  0.30  0.30  0.0o  0.30  0920  0.10
PAC  t  btiemel  Refinery  0.63  0.49  0.43  0.35  0.47  0.32  0.30  0.30  3.63  4.71  2.56  2.54  1.06  2.3S  1."  a.5B
6S3  E- 91  -
Table  17:  Pakistan:  Reporting  Rpquirements  of the  EAC
(i)  Monthlv  Operating  Results:
(a)  Profit  and Loss  Statement;
(b)  Operating  Expenses;
(c)  Cost  of goods  sold;
(d)  Manufacturing  Costs;
(e)  Inputs  Consumption;
(f)  Net Sales;
(g)  Sales  analysis;
(h)  Production  Cost;
(i)  Others  (energy  consumption,  production  losses,  man hours).
(ii)  Quarterly  Reportst:
(a)  Balance  Sheet
(b)  Cash  and Bank  Balance;
(c)  Trade  Receivables  Analysis;
(d)  Material  Inventory;
(e)  Finished  Goods  Inventory
(f)  Loans;
(g)  Taxes  and  Duties;
(h)  Product  Prices
(i)  Personnel  Summary  Officers;
(j)  Project  Progress  report
Source: EACTable  16:  Productionl  Value  at  Constant  Prices  of  1977-1978
(Nilltons  of  Rupees)
Pi  odual  Volvo a  ..tes  .
prices .of  1-  (12310) CIATIO  ui  T  (ai-be)
Imjoi  1361/3  136/0  116/5  £35/US  135/8  1360101  116/6  112/6  136/4  114/fl  *135/
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